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

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Letter From the Editor

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Dear Reader,

It is with great pride that I welcome you to the fifth issue of the DU Undergraduate Research Journal (DUURJ). Since our first issue two years ago, DUURJ's mission has been to showcase the finest research of the DU undergraduate community and foster an appreciation for diverse knowledge. So much of our society relies on thorough research from diverse communities of researchers. Understanding our history, environment, psychology, and culture (among others) leads us to a deeper collective understanding of who we are and our place in the world. It is our sincere desire to contribute to that conversation.

In these pages, you will find a sample of the diversity of DU's undergraduate research. We begin with an investigation of post-war Germany, then explore topics such as athletes' right to protest, populism in contemporary politics, Japanese film, gender in the context of workplace injury, and the effects of climate change on plant phenology. We also have two engaging interviews with DU faculty members doing research on classical Greek philosophy and supernovae in binary star systems, respectively. Finally, we have an editorial piece that discusses the various funding opportunities for undergraduate researchers. Scattered throughout this issue we have included truly imaginative works of visual art, shared with us by creative DU students.

As with any endeavor, this journal requires a dedicated team, whose hard work and determination makes the workflow and production of DUURJ not only efficient, but enjoyable. To the Editorial Board and Section Editors, thank you for making this an exciting process and for crafting DUURJ to fit our collective vision. To the authors who submitted their excellent work, thank you for your patience through numerous revisions, attentiveness to our suggestions for improvement, and willingness to share your work with the DU community. I am deeply grateful to Dr. Kate Tennis, our advisor, for her steadfast support of DUURJ, especially during these trying times. Finally, a special thank you goes to Toni Panzera, whose invaluable support, diligence, and advice has helped me in so many ways.

Research, in all its importance, is only half of a researcher's work in academia. The other half is sharing what they have discovered with the community; divulging the countless hours of reading, experimenting, and synthesizing in the hopes of broadening the community's understanding. With that in mind, I am happy to share with you not only my passion for academic research, but the passions of dozens of authors, artists, and editors. It is through their curiosity, creativity, and dedication that all this is possible.

Sincerely,

Arlo Simmerman

Arlo Simmerman
Editor in Chief

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

Untitled
by Amanda Kyle



Waves by Zac Abero

Promoting Democracy and Penance: The United States, Western Europe, and German Memory of the Holocaust

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"We Germans are indeed obliged without exception to understand clearly the question of our guilt ... What obliges us is our human dignity ... We cannot be indifferent to what the world thinks of us, for we know we are part of mankind – are human before we are German." – Karl Jaspers

Abstract

This research, using the writings of German and international intellectuals, journalists, and politicians, explores the late-twentieth-century German memory of the Holocaust and demonstrates the ways it was influenced by the international community. The path of this development was rocky and uncertain, with historical revisionism, denialism, and unchallenged taboo, but also sincere historical engagement. Reflecting a broader trend in the field of history, this work emphasizes the influence of the transnational in cultural shifts; rather than depict the German collective memory as static, or solely domestic, it seeks to demonstrate the influence of international actors, beliefs, and ideas at major inflection points throughout German history.

Keywords: German Memory, Collective Memory, National Identity, Intellectual History

1 INTRODUCTION

Collective memory and shared understandings of history help a people form a national identity. Germans understand themselves not solely by who and what they are today, but by where they have come from and what their shared history means to them. Thus, the past never really "passes." The past, instead, lives within the halls of museums, the pages of textbooks, and most importantly,the hearts and minds of those who collectively hold a shared history. In examining their past, Germans struggle to reckon, above all, with the Holocaust. As German historian Dan Diner has argued, the Holocaust is an "identity-forming foundational event" for Germany, and the memory of the Holocaust is "basic to Germany's moral and historical self-awareness"[1]. The moment in history when Germans were at their most destructive and inhumane, is paradoxically the period most fundamental to contemporary German identity. The idea that the memory of the Holocaust is significant for German identity is not new. What is less understood is the role of the international community in shaping German reckoning with the past.

The Holocaust was, by design, a transnational genocide. This, and the Allied occupation of Germany after the end of the war, ensured German memory of the Holocaust could not develop in isolation. The United States and Western Europe, from 1945 onward, exerted major influence in the development of that German memory. The decades running from 1945 – 2005 featured German and international leaders, intellectuals, and journalists in conversation about the Holocaust. International observers, especially Americans, expressed expectations on the formation of a German identity. This new forming identity, first in West Germany then in United Germany, entailed democracy and repentance for the Nazi past; these two factors were expected to function together. To international observers, the restoration of German democracy had to be connected to an honest engagement with their Nazi past.

German leaders, intellectuals, and journalists responded to this expectation. As German historian Jan-Werner Müller posited, West Germany and reunited Germany both used "history as a base for legitimacy," and that narratives about the German past helped to shape the "perception" of Germans in the present[2]. Throughout the decades, at several key moments in West German and German history, international observers and German figures interacted over questions of

German repentance for the Holocaust and their embrace of democracy. As British historian Timothy Garton Ash has argued, West European states, and West Germany especially, committed to "parliamentary democracy, the rule of law," and "market economy"[3]. The institution of these principles in West Germany was accompanied by frequent questions about the relationship between democracy and repentance for the Nazi past. In fact, international observers referred to these key moments as a "litmus test" for Germans to prove their repentance, democratic tradition, and historical consciousness. By addressing the international dimension of German memory, this study adds a fresh perspective to a rich historical literature.

2 HISTORIOGRAPHY

In recent years, scholars have greatly expanded our understanding of German memory. The 1990s experienced an explosion in memory studies and, as writer Nancy Wood argued in 1999, "[m]emory is decidedly in fashion"[1]. Wood's work, *Vectors of Memory* (1999) effectively demonstrates the ways "public memory" is shaped by the "will or desire of some social groups" to "select" and "organize" portrayals of the past as to influence others to embrace those portrayals as their own[1]. The author explores memory in France and Germany and analyzes how "public debates" in both nations have become a defining "feature of political culture itself"[1]. Wood investigates a series of "vectors," or significant dynamics influencing public memory, such as historiography, survivor testimonials, trials, novels, films, and the media. Wood's interest then lies in reflecting on the influence these "vectors" had on public debate.

Other scholars have documented significant aspects of German memory. For instance, German historian Ulrich Herbert's "Academic and Public Discourses on the Holocaust" (1999) explores one major event that challenged German memory: the Goldhagen debates. Sparked by Daniel Goldhagen's *Hitler's Willing Executioners* (1996), the book generated controversy and public debate in Germany. Herbert focuses on this controversy and analyzes responses to the book from German media and scholars. The author argues that the "course, form, and results" of the debates were influenced both by "decades-long" German public and scholarly engagement with the Holocaust and a "trap" set by American journalists[4]. Herbert argues this "trap" was set by American journalists, who stated that German reaction to Goldhagen's book would be the "decisive test" for how Germany has dealt with the Holocaust[4]. German academics and journalists knew their reaction to Goldhagen was being gauged in a broader context than simply a reaction to a book.

Alfred Low's, *The Third Reich and the Holocaust in German Historiography* (1994), impressively analyzes German studies of the Holocaust with an "emphasis" on the works of "major" German historians[5]. Low then outlines the works and positions of German scholars, exploring how each engaged with the research of the Holocaust. With this context, Low opines that the "growth" of German democracy, "greater distance" from Nazi atrocities, and the growth of neo-conservative and nationalist groups precipitated greater discourse on the Holocaust into the 1980s and 1990s. Each factor in turn enabled questions about evolving reunified German identity to develop with reference to the Nazi past. Building on this literature, Caroline Sharples' *Postwar Germany and the Holocaust* (2016) evaluates several factors in German memory, including trials, memorials, film, and prominent narratives, all of which shaped collective German memory. Sharples argues that the development of German memory of the Holocaust is fraught with "generational conflict," "competing memories," "silences," and even "mythologies"[6]. All these works taken together contribute to understanding the development of German memory of the Holocaust. None of them, however, pay sufficient attention to one of the major dynamics that influenced German memory of the Holocaust: expectations from the international community.

This article will evaluate two key episodes in the development of German memory of the Holocaust from major periods of united German history and indicate how both were influenced by international actors. It first explores issues related to German remembrance and reunification after the fall of the Berlin wall, then dives into the disruptions surrounding the Goldhagen debates in the 1990s. In Germany, international observers played a key role in shaping German reckoning with Nazi atrocities.

3 A NEW GERMANY GRAPPLES WITH DEMOCRACY AND REPENTANCE

The reunification of Germany, which took place over several years after the Berlin Wall fell in 1989, was a pivotal moment in German and European history. The decision to unify was not an easy one for Germans, who had for decades grown accustomed to the East/West division; nor was unification a popular idea on the international stage, as the four former allies – the US, France, the UK, and the USSR – all had to come to an agreement on how unification was carried out, if done at all. Nonetheless, West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl proceeded with German reunification negotiations at a brisk pace. Throughout, Kohl and Germany were tested as the long shadow of Hitler remained in the minds of many. Kohl needed to demonstrate his commitment to democratic traditions and, most importantly, was expected to recognize the Nazi past in order to prevent a Nazi future.

The "German question" of whether or not to unify East and West Germany was one of the foremost problems of the Cold War period. The Cold War nearly turned hot several times over the fate of Germany, as evidenced by the Berlin Airlift of 1948 – 1949 and the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961. As Mark Gilbert has argued, had there not been the presence of thermonuclear weapons, "there likely would have been a war over Berlin"[7]. Further, the original purpose of NATO, according to the organization's first Secretary General Lionel Ismay, was to "keep the Soviet Union out, the Americans in, and the Germans down"[8]. The decision of West Germany to unite with the East after the fall of the wall was not received neutrally by the nations who, for decades, worried over the consequences of a potential reunification. It was far from a minor domestic affair between two sister nations. Reunification instead involved all the major international players, many of whom still painfully recalled the prior aggression of Germany. Therefore, the process to merge two states into one was undertaken both with constant international involvement and acute historical awareness.

French president François Mitterrand worried that a unified Germany would no longer have any need for a unified Western Europe and would subsequently withdraw its support for European integration. British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, meanwhile, was firmly opposed to reunification as she feared that a strengthened Germany would disrupt the power balance within NATO; thereby weakening the United Kingdom[9]. Despite these concerns, Germany was able to proceed with unification in large part due to the support received from American president George H. W. Bush. According to American historian William Hitchcock, West German chancellor Helmut Kohl and Bush "seized upon the historic opportunity offered by the collapse of the wall to press for a swift unification of the two Germanys"[9].

In order to reunite and regain full sovereignty, Germany needed the assent of the four former allies. To assuage international fears and incentivize support, Kohl needed to face each concern directly. Kohl assured Mitterrand that in unifying, Germany would not seek to separate itself from the process of European integration[9]. Mikhail Gorbachev of the USSR, who at first demanded Germany's withdrawal from NATO, settled on accepting an "economic credit of 5 billion deutsche marks" and general realignment of NATO in Europe to "reflect the new relationships with the USSR"[9]. Some of the most substantial concerns were associated with memory of the Second World War and are best exemplified by the fears of Thatcher. She was concerned that "certain 'German characteristics' might soon reappear: 'angst, aggressiveness, assertiveness, bullying, egotism, inferiority complex, and sentimentality ...'"[9] To address these particular concerns, which were present in the minds of many, Kohl found that once again, he needed to demonstrate German political and cultural character which was honed over the decades following 1945.

Throughout the negotiations, Kohl maintained a stalwart belief that unification should only occur so long as West Germany's democratic institutions and free market were protected. Bush assured Kohl he had American support, as he "trusted the West Germans to handle the issue of unification while not endangering the Western alliance or harming the institutions of the European community"[9]. This indicates one of the fundamental characteristics of German reunification: namely that it could only occur if the new state maintained the democratic traditions it inherited, as shaped by the Western Allies, decades before.

These democratic traditions extended into the academic world and even to genuine recognition of their Nazi past. A draft treaty of unification, released to the public in August of 1990, referenced modern Germany's responsibility to the Holocaust, saying "a unified German state would be conscious of the continuity of German history and the resulting special responsibility for human rights and peace"[10]. American theologian Donald Shriver Jr. argued in the *Los Angeles Times* that as the Germans united, they also "embrace democracy and repentance [for the Nazi past]"[11]. To American journalist David Kantor of the *Jewish Advocate*, the somewhat vague statement in the draft treaty did not go far enough in acknowledging the genocide of the Jews. He argued the draft treaty not only failed to refer to the Nazi past, but such an omission was a cause for "sorrow and concern"[10]. There are two key ideas from these articles. First, upon unification, Germans were expected to embrace democracy and repentance for the Nazi past. Second, the international community watched and reinforced the demand for German recognition of the Holocaust throughout unification.

German repentance and democratic traditions were put to the test shortly after reunification. In 1995, worldwide celebrations marking the fiftieth anniversary of Victory in Europe Day provided the opportunity for Germans to publicly acknowledge their past. The flag of unified Germany flew in Paris alongside the flags of Russia, France, the UK, and the US, symbolically joining "the colors of the Allied powers" in a military parade[12]. On the same day in Berlin, a group of world leaders including American Vice President Al Gore, Mitterrand, German president Roman Herzog, Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, and British Prime Minister John Major gathered at the Schauspielhaus theater to celebrate and preach unity. Mitterrand declared "[t]he enemy of yesterday is the friend of today," and the victory of V-E day "was a victory of Europe over itself"[12]. Throughout the event, German recognition and repentance was clear. Herzog claimed "Germans today know very well – probably more clearly than 50 years ago

– that it was their government and many of their fathers who were responsible for the Holocaust and who brought ruin upon the nations of Europe"[12]. Respectfully, the other world leaders recognized the accomplishments of the new republic. Gore recalled Dwight Eisenhower's old declaration, "the successes of the war effort wouldn't be known until the 50th anniversary of V-E Day. If Germany is a stable democracy, then we will have succeeded"[12]. Gore confidently proclaimed, "I wish to report to Gen. Eisenhower: Mission fulfilled"[12]. Leaders from formerly antagonistic nations stood together and recognized the growth Germany achieved, all while Germany demonstrated both its democracy and repentance for the past.

Despite such proclamations, reunification posed a serious challenge for Germany memory of the Holocaust. West Germans politically overseeing the process had to grapple with integrating the disparate experiences and memories of East Germans, who had lived under Stasi domination for decades. Reunification forced Germans to "integrate these disparate postwar experiences into a national historical memory and devise ways to recall the victims of the so-called 'double past' – that of the Third Reich and the GDR"[6]. As the Berlin Wall fell, many in the intellectual left were opposed to unification. They feared that with the integration of 17 million formerly undemocratic East Germans, Germany might again "suffer from a democratic deficit and see renewed nationalism"[2]. Jürgen Habermas expressed alarm over the process, as he feared pursuing reunification signaled a return to conceptualizing the German people along nationalistic, rather than democratic lines. He felt Germans needed to not only "*display* but progressively *internalize* their commitment to constitutional patriotism," and "Germany was once again short-circuiting the lessons of historical memory" [emphasis added][1].

There were concerns among international academics as well. As Senior Associate for the US-based Endowment for International Peace Daniel Hamilton outlined, East Germans might have a "considerable impact" on their West German relatives[13]. His concern came from the fact that Communist-led East Germans had been unable to experience the "difficult process of digesting the Nazi past" due to Communist propaganda[13]. Unification, to observers domestically and internationally, may have posed a serious problem by enflaming right-wing nationalism. Despite these valid concerns, as historian Jan-Werner Müller argued, "there was no overall shift to the right" in the post-reunification years[2]. Their concerns proved legitimate but not until long after reunification. Müller attributed this continuity of liberal democracy to Helmut Kohl due to his genuine commitment to European unity and to the vigilance of German public intellectuals. West German intellectuals played a key role in maintaining liberal democracy; however, a thriving "liberal and democratic" political culture most helped to maintain the vitality of German democracy post-unification[2].

The completion of the final treaties of reunification signaled the genesis of a new nation. After almost five decades, East and West became one. Though young, the nation was founded on principles present in West Germany for decades. West German intellectuals, vigilant of West Germany's place in the international order, contributed a great deal to the foundation upon which reunified Germany built itself. Remembering the Holocaust, embracing the past, and committing to principles of democratic traditions were all hotly contested throughout the previous decades. Reunification did not end these debates and in some ways amplified them. *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* (coming to terms with the past) was a central part of contemporary German identity. It was inherited from the decades of West German engagement with the Holocaust but also inherited from the Western principles West Germans slowly embraced. The Germany that emerged in 1991 featured the legacy of West German intellectual engagement and integration into the Western world.

4 A CHALLENGE TO ACADEMIC STUDY OF THE HOLOCAUST: THE GOLDHAGEN DEBATES

The events that took place in 1996, only a few years after Germany's reunification, set a new intellectual course for German memory of the Holocaust. In March, a little-known American political scientist named Daniel Goldhagen published *Hitler's Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust*. Goldhagen, a professor at Harvard and son of a Jewish Holocaust survivor, recalibrated German academic discussion of the Holocaust. Where previously the *Historikerstreit* had brought academic attention to the Holocaust in West Germany and reasserted that the Holocaust should indeed be studied, Goldhagen questioned how the Holocaust should be studied. Goldhagen served for a short time as a conduit for international public opinion about the Holocaust and was effectively able to insert himself into German academic discussion on the issue. Within several months of the publication of *Hitler's Willing Executioners*, Goldhagen conducted a speaking tour throughout Germany, involved himself in several serious debates about the nature of the Holocaust, and had "monopolized public discussion"[4]. His study became so well known that, according to historian Ulrich Herbert, "the Holocaust and Goldhagen became virtually synonymous"[4]. Despite his popularity in the media and among the public, academic historians in Germany and around the world criticized Goldhagen's work[4].

Goldhagen argued that most ordinary Germans were willing, even enthusiastic contributors to the Holocaust as a consequence of a centuries-old, destructive form of

anti-Semitism innate to German culture. In its sweeping narrative and grand conclusion, many historians found far too much generalization, and far too little evidence. The differences between the academic fields of political science and history were relevant here. American political scientist Jack Levy identified these differences. Levy argued historians "describe, explain, and interpret" events. Conversely, political scientists "generalize" about connections between different variables and seek to "construct lawlike statements about social behavior."[14] As a political scientist, Goldhagen focused on one aspect of continuity in German society; the "antisemitism moved many thousands of 'ordinary' Germans – and would have moved millions more… to slaughter Jews"[15]. Goldhagen alleged the pervasiveness of one cultural attribute, antisemitism, determined the actionsof every perpetrator of the Holocaust. Further, Goldhagen's generalizations extended to each facet of his evaluation. He argued "every significant institution in Germany supported a malevolent image of Jews, and virtually every one of them actively contributed to the eliminationist program"[15]. Similarly, "Germany during the Nazi period was inhabited by people animated by beliefs about Jews that made them willing to become consenting mass executioners"[15]. Goldhagen emphasized centuries-long continuity over circumstances and contingencies, which are factors prioritized by historians.

Speaking on his motivation for writing the book, Goldhagen referenced a lecture about the Holocaust, where he remembered: "everyone was talking about why the order was given, but not about why it was carried out"[16]. He sought to outline what exactly about German culture and society could lead to the genocide of six million Jews. Goldhagen stated that postwar Germany was a "very changed country… [i]t's very hard for an individual to maintain views the whole world is saying are wrong"[16]. Goldhagen was not attempting to address latent anti-Semitism in contemporary Germany, as he believed that Germany changed dramatically after the war. Instead, he sought a reformation for how Germans discussed, researched, and understood the perpetrators of the Holocaust. He argued his account raised "difficult issues that Germans need to address"[16]. His main thesis, "antisemitism moved many thousands of 'ordinary' Germans – and would have moved millions more… to slaughter Jews"[15], attempted to demonstrate the apparent bloodlust of almost the entirety of German society.

Goldhagen removed the Holocaust from its context, even in how he examined the psychology of the perpetrators. As American historian Omer Bartov argued, Goldhagen's empathy was shown exclusively to the victims rather than the perpetrators and he instead focused on "portraying them as sadistic murderers"[17]. Goldhagen was not interested in exploring the multifaceted motivation, or the contingencies surrounding the perpetration of the Holocaust, but rather explaining the Holocaust by focusing primarily on one major factor: centuries-old anti-Semitism rooted in most of the German public. The issue came from the simplicity of the argument. Most German historians believed anti-Semitism was one of the many factors that spurred on the Holocaust. Could a genocide really be entirely explained primarily by centuries-old anti-Semitism among the German public? As Herbert argued, Goldhagen divorced the Holocaust "from the German war effort and brutal extermination policy," which included Jews, but also many other minorities[4]. Anti-Semitism did not help to explain the massacre of Russian prisoners of war, Poles, the Roma/Sinti, or those deemed as mentally or physically disabled. Goldhagen's book was largely rejected in academia, where it was described as "evidentially inadequate and methodologically simplistic"[4].

One of Goldhagen's prime adversaries, historian Hans Mommsen, debated him largely on historical grounds. Mommsen was involved in the *Historikerstreit* and the debates between Functionalists and Intentionalists from the 1960s, and he was familiar with public debate over German memory and identity. He had long argued that Hitler was a "weak dictator," which meant that much of the "Final Solution" was carried out by the compliance, apathy, and endorsement of broad segments of society[18]. German responsibility included many Nazis and Holocaust perpetrators but did not encompass the entire German society, as Goldhagen argued[19]. Mommsen felt Goldhagen rejected the cautiously constructed argument made by many German historians which emphasized "more complex understandings of what made the Third Reich tick"[19].

In September of 1996, Goldhagen actively debated several German historians, including Mommsen, on a stage in Berlin. Several of the historians accused Goldhagen of "simplifications and abbreviations"[20]. Mommsen argued "[t]he specific killing of the Jews was that it was not spontaneous, emotional killing… to reduce it to a bloodlust among ordinary Germans is inadmissible"[20]. Goldhagen saw his work as accomplishing more than pressing the specific conclusion he endorsed. Alan Cowell, journalist for the *New York Times*, indicated that Goldhagen was "credited with… transferring the Holocaust debate from the groves of academe to a broader public." While Cowell neglects the influence of the *Historikerstreit*, the point confirms what Goldhagen believed he was accomplishing. The value of *Hitler's Willing Executioners* was not derived from its academic merit, but instead came from bringing the debate about the Holocaust into the limelight of public thought in Germany and internationally.

The relationship between German identity and history, even after reunification, was not relegated to the

boundaries of the Federal Republic alone. Throughout the Goldhagen debates, public opinion was heavily influenced by the perspectives of the international community, particularly in the United States. The New York Times published five pieces on the topic in the span of a few days, and throughout them is a clear tone, insisting that "the German reaction to the book would be the decisive test for its dealing with the Holocaust"[4]. American journalist Richard Bernstein argued that *Hitler's Willing Executioners* "is one of those rare new works that merit the appellation landmark"[21]. Michael Ackerman argued that "[t]he issues raised by [Goldhagen] must be explored by students of history, regardless of how uncomfortable this proves for Germans"[22]. The German press picked up on this and echoed many similar concerns, with German historian Volker Ullrich in *Die Zeit* saying "[h]ow his provocative and disturbing piece is received – by that measure, much will be gauged about the historical consciousness of this republic"[4].

The reception of Goldhagen in Germany was thus not only explicitly linked to the decades of historical debate over identity but was further influenced by the expectations of the international community.[58] These international expectations established what Herbert called an "intellectual trap" from which Germans could not easily escape. To the international community, especially American news media, Germans failing to praise Goldhagen sufficiently might be connected to not only denying the conclusions of Goldhagen's book, but denying the impact of the Holocaust itself. Germans themselves expressed awareness of this "trap," and some went so far as to argue that the theory of collective guilt was reimplemented into Germany with Goldhagen as the vessel and the international public as the force behind it. This trap could be read in *Der Spiegel*, noting that "Goldhagen has revived" the Allies' use of collective guilt theories to persecute post-war Germans.

Some German figures, however, recognized the value of bringing an international public into the debate about the Holocaust. In March 1997, the German magazine *Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik* (Pieces on German and International politics) awarded Goldhagen its Democracy Prize[19]. Jürgen Habermas waded once again into public debates. Unlike many other senior scholars, however, he did so in defense of Goldhagen. Speaking at the award ceremony where Goldhagen was given the Democracy Prize, Habermas argued that through the "urgency, the forcefulness, and the moral strength of his presentation, Goldhagen had provided a powerful stimulus to the public conscience of the Federal Republic"[23]. Habermas managed to both recognize and praise the social accomplishments of the study without praising the book's academic merits. In doing so, Habermas left room for figures like Mommsen to uphold their scholarly disagreements with it.

The success of Goldhagen in effecting change in Germany, while largely attributable to the reception of the public at large, was most prominently furthered by his popularity among German university students. As Herbert indicated, "*Hitler's Willing Executioners* fulfills an understandable desire on the part of younger Germans: by agreeing with his book, they can stand on the side of the accusers rather than that of the accused"[4]. Thus, part of the positive reception Goldhagen experienced came from the younger generation wanting to be perceived as aware of their nation's past but ready to face the future as a changed society. They wanted to "show the world" that they had learned from the decades of debate, and from Goldhagen, and that they were, in fact, a new people.

On a deeper level, however, reception among younger generations, especially among college students, demonstrated the perceived inadequacies of German academia in handling the Holocaust. While the *Historikerstreit* managed to bring the Holocaust to the fore of German discussion, and reshape the way many Germans conceptualized their past, it did not change the way German academia researched or taught issues related to the Holocaust. Effecting this change was one of the major triumphs of the Goldhagen debates. Previously the Holocaust was lectured on in a "theoretical and detached" manner,concerned with issues such as "totalitarianism, bureaucratic rule, and a fragmented decision making process," as seen in the functionalism/intentionalism debates of the 1950s – 70s[17]. German college students then longed for an open, provocative discussion of the Holocaust, which they largely found in Goldhagen. Despite his scholarly missteps, Goldhagen reintroduced more personal and honest topics to the discussion of the Holocaust, such as the largely ignored "question of guilt and responsibility" as well as the horrors of genocide; this differed greatly from the distanced, bloodness interpretations that were so commonplace among German academics[17].

To Ulrich Herbert, the reason for the public/academic division, came down to the different spheres in which the work appeared. Historians regarded the book as a scholarly work and evaluated it as a study, whereas the public interpreted the piece as a crucial moment in the decades-long debate about German memory. The effusive public praise Goldhagen received, then, must be connected to this context. The German public demonstrated the importance of engaging with the Nazi past in their acceptance of Goldhagen. Goldhagen's damning generalizations and models, despite their rejection in German academia, were incredibly effective. Conclusions like his, that all ordinary Germans were responsible or willing contributors to the Holocaust, demanded change from the German academia, which was regularly stuck to a specific model of engaging with the Holocaust through a theoretical, distanced lens. Goldhagen brought the perpetrators to the forefront of research

on the Holocaust. As Herbert argued, he demonstrated "the necessity of returning to the face-to-face killing" and helped to move research on the Holocaust away from its detached approach[17].

According to Eley, the "Goldhagen effect" did not merely come down to the scholarly conclusions of the book. Instead, the success of Goldhagen was in his contributions to "a long-running public struggle to ground the ethics of democratic citizenship" in Germany, where the Nazi past seemed to prevent the use of the national past as a "source of inspiration"[19]. *Hitler's Willing Executioners* then ought not to be taken merely at face value, as its importance lay in its effecting change in German society. As Bartov argued, the implication and impact of the Goldhagen debate on academia in Germany were tremendous. The debate forced German academics to recognize "the centrality of" the Holocaust and to "change the methodology of research on" it[17]. The reception of Goldhagen among the German public managed to demonstrate that "Nazism ... remained a crucial issue in German political, intellectual, and scholarly discourse"[17].

Further, Bartov identified a compelling distinction between the scholarly reception of Goldhagen by German and American academics. While German historians had largely criticized Goldhagen throughout his speaking tour, they slowly began to recognize the social value of reconsidering how the Holocaust was researched; American historians largely did not. In America, Goldhagen's "long-term impact on the scholarship of the period" was not "particularly significant"[17]. Similarly, the reception of Goldhagen was largely positive in American media, but in Germany it was critiqued by academics. Jewish American author Burton Hersh argued in a letter to the editor of the *New York Times* that Goldhagen used an "ant's-eye view," which reflected "a very limited sense of the character of the complex, multilayered culture" of Germany since 1914[24]. Furthermore, the book generated "only limited intellectual interest" in France and Israel, demonstrating some degree of solidarity among historians across national divides[17]. Thus, Goldhagen's significance was only clear among Germans, and even there it was initially deeply challenged.

The key legacy of Goldhagen and the Goldhagen debates will not be the use of *Hitler's Willing Executioners* in German classrooms. According to Herbert, by 1999, three years after the book's publication, *Hitler's Willing Executioners* did not "appear in the syllabi of university courses on the Holocaust" in Germany[4]. Instead, Goldhagen's influence has resulted in a recalibration of the collective German perspective on the Holocaust. Where the *Historikerstreit* enforced the idea that the Holocaust should be discussed, the Goldhagen debates forced German historians to reconsider how the Holocaust is researched. In the following decade, public debate shifted again through another vector: the construction of a memorial.

5 CONCLUSION

These case studies demonstrate that the international community played a key role in shaping the memory of the Holocaust. The international community was yet another factor that influenced the development of German memory. German scholars, leaders, and journalists conversed with international figures, changing the way Germans memorialized, researched, and discussed the Holocaust; these discussions, in turn, impacted questions about what it means to be German, post-Auschwitz.

Today, Germans continue to engage with memory of the Holocaust. In recent years, the rise of the German far-right political party Alternative for Germany (*Alternative für Deutschland/AfD*) has again forced Germans to grapple with memory of the Holocaust. As contemporary commentators on German reunification feared, many *AfD* voters and party leaders come from East Germany. Lower relative prosperity provoked a sense of being "second-class citizens" in many East Germans[25]. On a more subconscious level, however, eastern German support for the *AfD* is likely also rooted in the difference in Holocaust education during the Cold War. For decades, West Germans reinvestigated what it meant to have a national identity in the shadow of Nazism. East Germans, however, did not experience such development.

There is, in fact, still a sense among many Germans and international observers that Germany is not doing enough to address recent shifts to the right. Peter Eisenman, architect of the Holocaust memorial in Berlin, argued in 2016 that because of the "growing hatred and anti-Semitism across Europe" his memorial project "wouldn't be built today"[26]. German-Jewish writer Max Czollek, in his 2020 book *De-integrate Yourselves*, argues that Jewish Germans symbolize the "German narrative of not being Nazi anymore"[27]. He goes on to say, that despite having many Jewish Germans, Germany is failing to reckon with the recent "rise of anti-Semitism, xenophobia, and racism," symbolized by the popularity of the *AfD*[27].

Nonetheless, German politicians frequently reference the German past to international audiences. On May 8, 2020, the 75th anniversary of V-E day, many public figures connected Germany's Nazi past with responsibility to the present. German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas proclaimed in a memo to all German diplomatic missions that Germany's commitment to "human rights," and "international cooperation," stem from the knowledge of "the unparalleled crimes... that found their most monstrous expression in the Holocaust"[28]. He went on to say that German history reveals the threat

of "revisionism that replaces rational thinking with national myths", addressing revisionism and the recent rise of nationalism in Germany[28]. Maas argued there is no question that "Germany alone unleashed the Second World War," and that people who seek to revise this sentiment "do injustice to the victims, exploit history for their own ends and divide Europe"[28]. Similarly, in celebration of V-E day, the German Delegation to NATO proclaimed in a tweet that "Germany accepts full responsibility for the atrocities committed by Nazi Germany." Indeed, as Nancy Wood suggests, it may be better to conceptualize grappling with the past, not as *Vergangenheitsbewältigung*, which implies that the past can be definitively overcome, but instead as *Aufarbeitung* (to grapple with something), which instead indicates a never-ending engagement with the past[1].

I have argued that the international community, explicitly, through occupation policies in the early postwar years and, subtly, later through diplomacy and proclaimed expectations, shaped German memory of the Holocaust. Throughout the decades, as Germans found new ways to engage with memory of the Holocaust, they once again forged a new national identity in the wake of Nazism. Just as the Western Allies originally hoped, the business of recreating a nation was not done in the old political and ideological framework of radical nationalism. Instead, it was done within the framework of the expected "Western" ideals, with a commitment to pluralism, democracy, and academic freedom. Thus, German memory of the Holocaust ought to be understood not as the product of isolated scholar opinion, but as the culmination of factors, internal and external, that shaped the identity of a nation. This memory-work lived and breathed in public debates over the decades, and shaped a national identity fundamentally committed to questioning the legacy of the past.

6 FUTURE DIRECTIONS

The opportunities for historical research in German memory are vast, despite the expansive literature that already exists on German history and the Holocaust. Historians are, in recent years, attributing greater and greater influence on issues that span borders and cross cultures under the umbrella term of Globalization. Perhaps this article demonstrates an early, and unconscious, reflection of the significance of non-national narratives in the field of history[29]. Such work analyzing the non-German sources of German engagement with memory of the Holocaust has great potential, whether emphasizing new populations or new theoretical models of approach. In the field of history, post-structural theorists emphasize the sources of power in language. A post-structuralist approach could be applied to the language used both by Germans and international commentators, analyzing the origins of power in Holocaust memory discourse. Similarly relevant is the intricate relationship between Israel and West Germany. How might Israelis have contributed to memory construction? Likewise, how might memory construction in East Germany be influenced by Soviet regulations and more indirect expectations? The relationship between international figures and domestic memory construction offers many potential directions of study.

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8 EDITOR'S NOTES

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Untitled by Luke Penton

Rule 50 and its Discontents: Athletes' Right to Protest

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Abstract

This issue brief discusses the debate surrounding Rule 50 of the Olympic Charter and athletes' right to protest emphasizing the current importance of the matter concerning the recently concluded Tokyo 2021 Games. First, it discusses those who argue for the rule such as the president of the International Olympic Committee (IOC), the IOC itself, and athletes such as Feyisa Lilesa, Gwen Berry, and Race Imboden. Next, the brief turns to the cases against Rule 50 with an examination of scholarship on the matter as well as two case studies of Lilesa, and Berry/Imboden. These case studies examine three instances of protest over two different IOC sanctioned events. The issue brief then pivots to an examination of the idea of athletes' protest from a communications perspective with a look into nonverbal demonstration. Finally, the paper provides a possible explanation for the Olympics' long-standing commitment to Rule 50 through the intersection of Coakley's Great Sport Myth and the Myth of Sport's Autonomy.

1 INTRODUCTION

The history of political activism at the Olympic Games is a long and contentious one. The Olympics have placed a focus on the values that the games uphold since Baron de Coubertin founded them in the l896. He once said that athletes who competed in the Olympics should be "imbued with a sense of the moral grandeur of the games"[1]. Part of this "moral grandeur" is the separation of politics and the Olympics. This tenet of the Olympic ethical code is perhaps one of its most infamous and polarizing rules. Rule 50 of the Olympic Charter states that, "No kind of demonstration or political, religious or racial propaganda is permitted in any Olympic sites, venues or other areas"[2]. The Olympics insist that the focus of the games must be on "athletes' performances, sport, and the international unity and harmony that the Olympic Movement seeks to advance"[2]. However, many athletes, both past and present, have used the stage that the Olympics gives them to demonstrate for the causes that they believe in. These efforts have often been met with harsh penalties and this is where the discontent lies.

In the lead-up to the 2021 Tokyo Summer Olympic Games, the debate around Rule 50 and athletes' right to protest became fiery with prominent figures like the International Olympic Committee (IOC) president Thomas Bach stepping up to defend it and some academics and athletes calling for amendment or abolishment. This issue brief presents the contemporary debate around Rule 50, several case studies of athlete protest, an examination from a communications perspective dissecting nonverbal protest, and possible explanations for the IOC's strict adherence to the rule.

2 THE CURRENT DEBATE ON RULE 50 – THOSE IN FAVOR

Thomas Bach has been one of the fiercest defenders of Rule 50. In an editorial he wrote for The Guardian, he maintains that through the Olympic Games "we are all equal" and that there is a certain "magic" around the games that is compromised by political demonstration such as boycotts. When Bach was a boy, he saw African athletes in despair at finding out they had to return home because of a last-minute boycott of the games. The magic that he refers to comes from the values that the Olympics strive toward such as inclusivity, equality, and peace[3]. Unsurprisingly, Bach's views are completely synchronized with the explanation that the IOC gives for their unwavering faith in Rule 50 to provide the best possible experience for the countries, their athletes, and the fans. They believe that it is paramount that "sport is neutral and must be separate from political, religious or any other type of interference" and that a respect for diversity of differing views or values is achieved through this segregation of sport and politics[2]. Also, while there are athletes who have protested or desired to protest at the Olympics, there are other findings that suggest that many of them agree with Bach and the IOC. In a study done for the IOC by the Australian Olympic Committee in 2020, only around 19 percent of the respondents felt that self-expression

would be appropriate in any circumstance and more than 80 percent agreed that protest during events at the games would be detrimental to the athlete's experience and/or performance[4].

3 THE CURRENT DEBATE ON RULE 50 – THOSE AGAINST

The two largest sources of challenge to Rule 50 come from academics and athletes themselves. This section will focus mainly on academic writings on the topic. Athletes' perspectives will be explored through case studies later in the brief. Sports scholars have taken several different approaches to the issue of athletes' rights to protest. These approaches include an examination of preexisting scholarship, a look at the intersection of the rights of indigenous people and Rule 50, and insight into the inconsistency of the IOC itself in enforcing the rule.

First, Cathal Kilcline, a former researcher for the EU commission and noted sports scholar, writes about the body of work on sports protests and finds that there is a pervasive philosophy that sport is or at least should be apolitical. He demonstrates through his analysis of other scholars' work that this idea is a "mirage", that this mirage vanishes when athletes do protest which is why the protest is often met with hostility directly after it happens[5]. Kilcline finds that sports protest can indeed have a lasting impact as there have been some examples of some "moral visions" being "articulated and contested through sport"[5]. The most important thing to highlight from this article is that there is a common idea that sport is apolitical and that this idea is propagated by the "dominant power holders in sport" (i.e., the IOC)[5].

Second, one of the more intriguing ideas from sports scholarship comes from Christine O'Bonsawin, an Associate Professor of History and Indigenous Studies for the University of Victoria. She argues that Rule 50 "categorically sustains the illegal mission of colonizing settler governments that attempt to rule over Indigenous people and their lands"[6]. She argues that the Olympics offer a grand stage for protest and that Rule 50 is a way for traditional colonial powers to maintain their hegemony over indigenous peoples[6]. She concludes that many still tout sports as a great equalizer, which has put it in a position to fly under the consequences of political agendas/conflicts but also presents an opportunity for colonial powers to continue to oppress indigenous people[6]. O'Bonsawin's article presents one of the most damning cases against Rule 50, as she contends that not only is the rule infringing upon individual rights but that it is a more sinister tool to assert colonial powers control over indigenous people in an era when that kind of racist totalitarianism is perceived by most of the world as evil.

Finally, Stanis Elsborg a Senior analyst and head of conference of Play the Game, a sports think tank, run by the Danish Institute for Sports Studies, adds to the body of work around Rule 50. His 2020 article argues that the IOC has been inconsistent in their enforcement of Rule 50 regarding athletes versus the host nations themselves[7]. He cites the IOC's "blind eye" to the political symbols that Russia included in its domestic broadcast of the games and the "national narrative that glorified the Czarist and Soviet-era" which the Russian government crafted as a prime example of this hypocrisy[7]. He goes on to speak about similar phenomena in the Beijing and London games and contrasts those with the harsh reaction to Tommie Smith and John Carlos raising Black Power fists at the 1968 Mexico City games[7]. The hypocritical enforcement of Rule 50 adds even more power to O'Bonsawin's theory about the rights of indigenous peoples because it presents the IOC as a friend to countries which in many cases are the colonial powers themselves rather than the individual athletes.

Figure 1. John Carlos and Tommie Smith, 1968[8]

The common thread throughout the literature surrounding athletes' right to protest and Rule 50 is the authors focus on athletes' agency versus the Olympics themselves. Kilcline approaches this by affirming that an athlete's protest can be impactful[5]. O'Bonsawin's piece touches on agency by highlighting the Olympic's attempts to take away athletes' agency, especially indigenous athletes through the perpetuation of colonial hegemony[6]. Elsborg highlights a similar attempt at the deprivation of athletes' agency through hypocritical selective enforcement of Rule 50[7]. Examining the litera-

ture surrounding athletes' right to protest is necessary to provide context on the issue. To fully understand the situation, however, this context must be paired with an examination of the athletes themselves and the protests that they have carried out.

4 CASE STUDIES IN ATHLETE PROTEST

Feyisa Lilesa is an Ethiopian marathon runner who took the silver medal in the 2016 Rio Olympic games. He is part of the Oromo people who are Ethiopia's largest ethnic nation. The Oromo and Ethiopia's government have clashed around the planned annexation of Oromo land. Ethiopia's government has been accused of using violence against those Oromo who opposed the annexation and "hundreds have been killed, many of them children ..." Lilesa used the massive stage of the 2016 Rio Olympics to advocate for the plight of his people. As he approached the finish line of the marathon with the thousands of spectators bearing witness to his monumental accomplishment of a Silver medal, he raised his arms and crossed them at the wrist, clenching his hands in fists. This is "an Oromo gesture of defiance." This defiant act resulted in his exile from Ethiopia[9].

Another protest that garnered international attention was Gwen Berry's decision to raise a Black Power Fist and Race Imboden's decision to kneel during the national anthem for the 2019 Pan American Games (which are governed by the IOC). Both athletes were demonstrating against the racial injustice that they perceived in the United States. Berry stated, "[s]omebody has to talk about the things that are too uncomfortable to talk about. Somebody has to stand for all of the injustices that are going on in America and a president who's making it worse." They were both punished with harsh 12-month suspensions by the IOC and the United States Olympic and Paralympic Committee[10]. These case studies offer powerful insight into the taboo nature of protest at the Olympics. In Lilesa's case, he was banned from his own country, and in Imboden's and Berry's, they were suspended from competing in their sports for an entire year.

5 ATHLETE PROTEST FROM A COMMUNICATIONS PERSPECTIVE

One important facet of the issue of Rule 50 and athletes' right to protest to consider is a brief examination of the nature of these protests themselves. Many of the most famous protests that athletes have made, especially during the Olympics, have been nonverbal in nature as demonstrated by the case studies of Feyisa Lilesa, Gwen Berry, and Race Imboden. As O'Bonsawin mentioned, the Olympics are "inherently politicized" and provide an incredible platform for political demonstration by the athletes[6]. The fact that the Olympics are a large platform for demonstration is important, and the type of demonstration that is endemic to the games should also be noted. Overwhelmingly, it is nonverbal protest that receives the most attention during the Olympics. This is demonstrated by all three case studies as well as the enduring picture of John Carlos and Tommie Smith who were banned from competing for the United States because of their nonverbal Black Power Fist protest at the 1968 Mexico City Games[11]. The stage for Olympic athletes is almost solely based on their actions rather than their words. If one internalizes this idea, it is not hard to see why so many athletes have chosen to use nonverbal protest to demonstrate their beliefs. On a stage that invites them to act, when athletes stand up for what they believe in, it is the universality of action that can captivate the masses.

Nonverbal protest can be everything from a gesture to a tattoo. In the case of the Olympics, gestures such as kneeling or other symbols of defiance like the Black Power Fist have been popular among athletes. A study that examined nonverbal communication in politics by University of Heidelberg Senior Researcher Delia Dumitrescu found that nonverbal cues were important when the audience had little context to an issue[12]. This makes sense in an Olympic context when athletes protest issues that are specific to their countries and are then seen by millions who would have a little context to their specific situation. The same study also contended that nonverbal information had the most effect "on politically relevant attitudinal and behavioral outcomes" when this information was disseminated by itself without any other messages on the matter[12]. This phenomenon ostensibly leads to athletes' nonverbal protests being successful because their protests are both non-vocal and presented without any other political context or information.

6 A DEEPER LOOK AT THE OLYMPICS' ATTACHMENT TO RULE 50

One possible explanation for the IOC's strict adherence to Rule 50 comes from the intersection of Coakley's Great Sport Myth and the myth of sport's autonomy mentioned in the Routledge Handbook of Sports and Politics. Coakley's Great Sport Myth is the idea that there is a pervasive myth in sports that sport is inherently good or pure; this myth is often extended to say that this inherent goodness is transmitted to the athletes and fans, and also that "sport inevitably leads to community development"[13]. The myth of sports autonomy is the idea that the global sports elites (i.e., the IOC or FIFA) perpetuate the thought that "sport and politics do not or, at the very least, should not mix"[14]. At the nexus of these two myths, it is possible to conclude that sport transcends politics. It is possible that the IOC has arrived at this conclusion through a belief or at least

a desire to propagate the belief in the aforementioned sports myths. If this is indeed the case, then it is clear why the IOC would adhere so strictly to Rule 50; if politics were to enter the Olympics through protest, then the inherent goodness and purity of the games would be compromised. This theory explains the harsh reactions to athletes such as John Carlos, Tommie Smith, and Gwen Berry among many others.

7 CONCLUSION

Today's Olympic context is fraught with the rise of social issues such as the Black Lives Matter Movement, the plight of the Oromo people, the rights for indigenous people everywhere, and the desire of athletes to stand up for what they believe in. The Olympics take a staunch line against protest with their Rule 50 in an attempt to keep the pinnacle of international sports competition apolitical. IOC President Thomas Bach's desires to keep politics out of the Olympics and to keep the "magic" alive contrasted with athletes like Feyisa Lilesa, Gwen Berry, and Race Imboden emulating protests like John Carlos and Tommie Smith, is an issue that can no longer be ignored[3]. Based on the literature examined, although the Olympics will try to fight as long as it can to maintain Rule 50, this issue brief contends that pressure from athletes and scholars alike will force some sort of change to accommodate protest. Rule 50 must reckon with its discontents.

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Magnify by Alex Blom

The Populist Paradox: A Critical Framework Proposal

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Abstract

Donald Trump's presidency has undeniably reignited academic interest in understanding the populist phenomenon and its political implications. Trumpian politics are frequently considered to be a stark departure from status quo politics, in favor of a radical right populism. Yet, the Trump presidency and populist theory itself poses a key contradiction, namely a populist paradox. I will propose a critical framework to understand populism as a mechanism of political power by the liberal state. In *What is Populism?*, Jan-Werner Müller identifies a contradictory nature to populism, as it often perpetuates the same political problems that the populist politics sought to replace. How could populist ideology, which is lauded as recognizing the systematic failures of the liberal state, also be a mechanism for its continued control? This paradox requires a theoretical framework to explain and unpack its implications. The seminal work of political philosopher Michel Foucault has immense explanatory power for this paradox when utilized as a conceptual framework. Populism ideology functions as a democratic justification for the maintenance of status-quo politics, which ultimately reproduces state power. I intend to develop a theoretical contribution to radical right populism studies, especially in regard to Trumpism in the United States. Interpreting Foucault's state power theories, this article applies the key concepts of power-knowledge, domination, and governmentality to populism studies.

1 LITERATURE REVIEW

It is important to appreciate, foremost, what is meant by populism and the context in which populist politics occur. In short, it is a moralistic ideology in which a leader and/or party claims true representation of a political body also referred to as 'the people.' Liberal democracies tend to host the political conditions for populism, and these types of states are positioned as antithetical to the populist cause. The construction of 'the people' will first be analyzed, followed by a broader political contextualization of the populist phenomenon. This analysis will also focus on what Mudde has coined "the populist radical right"[1]. This includes populist leaders, parties, movements, etc. that accompany a significantly conservative host ideology. Cases such as former President Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, Podemos in Spain, former President Rafael Correa in Ecuador, etc. are far too diverse to conceptualize neatly alongside right flavors of populism. There is value in narrowing the scope of inquiry when discussing such a broad and complex ideology. When the term 'populism' is used in this analysis, it implies the radical right notion of the word. Further, it is crucial to delineate the difference between populism ideology, and evaluations of populist governance in actuality. The criteria and circumstances surrounding populism as an ideology, or in its ideal state, will be articulated in the literature review. The analytical section transitions into assessing populist governance, which often proves inconsistent with the ideology. Finally, there exists a vast variety of populism scholarship with, often, oppositional definitions and conceptualizations of the phenomenon. In this analysis, I mainly rely on the theoretical works of Cas Mudde and Jan-Werner Müller. These scholars are some of the foremost and most widely cited in the field. Further research should be dedicated to alternative understandings of populism that cannot be fully captured in the space of this article.

1.1 Constructing 'The People'

Firstly, populism scholar Cas Mudde identifies a few key criteria for populist ideology. He defines populism as "an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, 'the pure people' versus 'the corrupt elite,' and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people"[2]. Essentially, populism at its core must engage in a fragmentation of a body politic into two fundamentally oppositional groups which compete for political representation. The populist makes a claim to represent a majority of common people in the nation and seeks to execute politics in their favor. This group represented

by the populist is considered to be 'the people' of a nation.

Importantly, Mudde also categorizes populism as a uniquely 'thin-centered ideology'[2] to address the often-contradictory nature of defining populism. How can leaders such as Hugo Chávez and Viktor Orbán both exist under the umbrella of populism with their vast political differences? A thin populism must accompany what Mudde calls a stronger 'host ideology' or 'thick ideology' that provides meaningful political substance to the populist leader, party, etc. For instance, the Prime Minister of Hungary, Viktor Orbán, is often classified by scholars as a populist leader. His substantive political ideology, however, is more accurately classified as radical right or conservative. Austerity policies to cut taxes for many Hungarian companies[3] is a conservative strategy, as it mirrors other conservative policies, but not necessarily the politics of other populist leaders. Former president of Venezuela, Hugo Chávez, on the other hand, almost doubled the tax rate for foreign oil companies in 2006[4]. Both leaders tend to be classified as populist by academics yet have immensely different and even oppositional policy agendas. Rather than "a 'full' or 'thick' ideology (such as liberalism or socialism) ... thin ideologies have a much more restricted core and focus on only a limited number of key concepts ... [and] do not attempt to provide the ideational roadmap for the wide range of questions that a full ideology would"[5]. Populism does not necessarily assume any political stance or policy advocacy, but rather looks to the 'host ideology' for political substance. For Orbán and Chávez, their populist ideology does not inform their policy agendas regarding taxation nearly as much as their thicker and substantive host ideologies of radical right conservatism and socialism respectively. Populism, itself, is not a reliable resource for a policy agenda, so leaders utilize accompanying thicker ideologies to form their substantive politics. From this, it is useful to characterize populism as a thin ideology to be understood as accompanying a more substantial ideology.

Further, populism is best thought of as a thin ideology as opposed to merely a rhetorical tool that can describe any or every politician or party. Populism is a combination of the following criteria, rather than instantiating certain parts. A politician can critique a political elite without utilizing moralism or holism and would, thus, not be considered properly populist. Similarly, a moralistic political stance need not be populist if it does not support the general will of the people. At its core, ideology itself is "a system of ideas that aspires both to explain the world and to change it. The populist, for instance, explains the world (or the nation) as consisting of two inherently oppositional groups within a liberal democratic system that has left 'the people' disenfranchised. In order to resolve the issues of an increasingly distant technocratic government, the populist proposes that they govern for 'the people.' Thus, populism's ideological contribution cannot be attributed to any or all politicians but is rather a unique political phenomenon.

Secondly, the construction of 'the people' is also uniquely moralistic and couched in values. Mudde writes that populism is "moralistic rather than programmatic"[2], or focuses on inclusion and exclusion rather than political substance. Scholars such as Müller agree, and write that "the claim to exclusive representation is not an empirical one; it is always distinctly moral ... [and] the populist logic also implies that whoever does not support populist parties might not be a proper part of the people- always defined as righteous and morally pure"[6]. The question of belonging to 'the people' of a nation also becomes a fundamental and morally existential one. It is notable that this logic relies upon moral symbols rather than evidential logic. Essentially, "what matters for populists is less the product of a genuine process of will-formation or a common good that anyone with common sense can glean than a symbolic representation of the 'real people' from which the correct policy is then deduced ... [which] renders the political positions of a populist immune to empirical refutation"[6]. Specifically, "populism requires a pars pro toto argument and a claim to exclusive representation, understood in a moral, as opposed to empirical sense"[6]. For instance, Trump's "condemnation of 'Crooked Hillary' during his 2016 election campaign, to which the crowd responded by chanting 'lock her up!'... [and] listing of unacceptable/corrupt acts committed by Congresswoman Ilhan Omar against 'hard-working Americans,' to which the crowd responded by chanting 'send her back!'"[7] demonstrate clear judgement of the morality of his political oppositions. Ultimately, the populist "may not win 100 percent of the vote, but they lay claim to 100 percent of the support of good, hardworking folks who have been exploited by the establishment"[8].

This characterization of populism as a specifically moralistic ideology does not reduce populist ideology as based solely on whims and illogical emotions of a group. To do so would simplify the complexity of populist ideology. Rather, while populist ideology is rooted in moralism and emotion, that is not to say that it is inherently illegitimate or unconvincing. That is proven untrue by cases of populist political success such as former President Donald Trump in the US, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Turkey, President Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil, etc. There would be no reason to study populist politics if it could be so reduced. Ultimately, "it is not just patronizing to explain the entire [populist] phenomenon as an inarticulate political expression... it is also not really an explanation"[6].

Moreover, belonging to 'the people' of a nation is more consequential than merely an individual's claim-

ing of a political identity. To populists, "opponents are not just people with different priorities and values, they are evil!"[2] A necessary component of constructing 'the people' of a nation as morally righteous and pure, is the creation of a foil, or opposite, which instantiates opposite characteristics within 'the other.' Consequently, political "compromise [becomes] impossible, as it 'corrupts' the purity"[2] and 'the people' and 'the other' become fundamentally incompatible and existentially threatening to each other. Populists position "the pure, innocent, always hardworking people against a corrupt elite who do not really work (other than to further their self-interest) and, in right-wing populism, also against the very bottom of society (those who also do not really work and live like parasites off the work of others)"[6]. 'The people' are also often characterized as "the 'common people' (the part of the res publica made up of commoners, or in modern terms: the excluded, the downtrodden, and the forgotten)"[6]. Ultimately, the "core claim of populism ... [is that] only some of the people are really the people"[6].

Thus, in constructing 'the people' of a nation, the group becomes a political "macrosubject"[6], and is understood by the populist leader as a homogenous and morally pure entity which they have the sole representative claim. A political holism develops, which is "the notion that the polity should no longer be split and the idea that it's possible for the people to be one and- all of them- to have one true representative"[6]. Within this claim to representation, there is also a subsequent mediatory role that the populist subsumes. Populists always want "to cut out the middleman, so to speak, and to rely as little as possible on complex party organizations as intermediaries between citizens and politicians"[6]. The populist leader becomes a site in which politics is accessed by 'the people,' and in turn, a conductor for politics to access the true will of 'the people.'

Lastly, here are a few common critiques of populism that ought to be mentioned. Namely, populist ideological opposition to pluralism and debate, and its support for holism. Pluralism is one of the first clear issues within populist ideology, demonstrated when the populist can no longer conceive a legitimate opposition to the morally righteous politics of the populists. A pluralistic perspective, in contrast, would value the coexistence and collaboration of multiple political values together in a representative state. This inherently has negative consequences for political debate and democratic norms that require one to legitimize, while not necessarily agreeing with, one's opposition. Müller writes that "when [populists] are in power, there is likewise no such thing as a legitimate opposition"[6].

Similarly, the multi-dimensionality and variety that exists within a body politic cannot be fully captured by populist holism. The formation process for constructing the people requires it to "be 'extracted' from the sum total of actual citizens ... [and] then presumed to be morally pure and unerring in its will"[6]. However, fundamentally, a "whole people can never be grasped and represented- not least because it never remains the same, not even for a minute: citizens die, new citizens are born ... [and] yet it is always tempting to claim that one can actually know the people as such"[6]. To conceive of 'the people' as a monolith is a contested assumption by many scholars.

1.2 Contextualizing 'The People': Liberal Democracy and Technocracy

The context in which populist politics emerges is also a contentious subject for populism scholars. In what kind of political environment do populist politics emerge? One of the prerequisite claims made by populists is that their democratic state has failed to meaningfully represent common citizens, also known as 'the people.' Many political contexts for populism exist within a 'liberal democratic state.' Definitionally, a "liberal democracy is a system in which [citizens] participate by voting for a representative who usually comes from a political party, and where the scope of government is limited by liberal freedoms and the rule of law"[9]. In essence, a liberal democracy is characterized by a fair and free representative voting system alongside individual liberties. The core concept of this kind of system is that voters can have meaningful influence in their nation's politics and feel politically efficacious. Liberal democracy is also fundamentally "based on pluralism—on the idea that you have different groups with different interests and values, which are all legitimate"[8]. Currently, "96 out of 167 countries with populations of at least 500,000 (57%) were democracies of some kind, and only 21 (13%) were autocracies." Populism, as defined, tends to only be meaningfully present in democratic states.

The ideal of the liberal democratic state, however, is not realized from the populist's perspective. Rather, populist politics claim to be "a potential corrective for a politics that has somehow become too distant from 'the people"'[10]. Some populism scholars come to agree with the populist's recognition of the shortcomings of the state but may not support particular attempts to alleviate the issues. For example, Richard Hofstadter wrote in his seminal text *The Age of Reform* that historically, "populism was the first modern political movement of practical importance in the United States to insist that the federal government has some responsibility for the common weal." Further, scholars such as Chantal Mouffe and Ernesto Laclau characterize the shortcomings of the liberal democratic state but depart towards a progressive and leftist populism. Left populism is an attempt to "radicalize social democracy" and oppose a "bourgeois democracy" in a way that addresses some of the very same issues that mobilize radical right

populists. Essentially, most instances of populism identify an issue with the existing government but deviate when it comes to policy agendas aimed at fixing the problems. These differences can be attributed to the differences in 'thick' ideologies that accompany populism. Nevertheless, this particular investigation attempts to isolate the radical right flavor of populism for clarity and analytical purposes.

Populist ideology juxtaposes itself with the existing liberal democratic establishment, which is often characterized as technocratic and far removed from the real lives of citizens. There is a "long tradition of a more 'elitist' conception of democracy [controlled by] ... increasingly distant and technocratic political and economic elites." Namely, populists often argue that "liberal democracies are increasingly dominated by highly educated and liberal elites whose backgrounds and outlook differ fundamentally from those of the average citizen; a development that has been exacerbated by the rise of a new 'governance elite', connected through informal and formal networks that cut across elected national governments." Thomas Frank described this view of liberal democracies as the "elitist theory of democracy" in which there is reason for political disenfranchisement. It is a conception of the state as a system that works to maintain "consensus quietly, harmoniously, and without too much interference from subaltern groups." Populists construct their political style as a foil to the established elite similarly to the process of characterizing 'the people.' Benjamin Moffitt recognizes that populists prefer 'common sense' or the wisdom of the people, 'bad manners,' and emotionality, whereas the technocratic style centers expertise and specialized training, 'proper manners,' dry and scientific language, and emotional neutrality, or 'rationality.' In other words, "technocracy and populism are mirror images: one is managerial, the other charismatic: one seeks incremental change, the other is attracted by grandiose rhetoric; one is about problem solving, the other about the politics of identity."

Liberal democratic nations can thus witness "a crisis of faith in democracy, with political party membership falling dramatically and citizens finding themselves more and more disillusioned with mainstream politics." The successes of populism can be "connected to what one might call promises of democracy that have not been fulfilled." Essentially, many political theorists conceptualize populism as a response to waning political efficacy and a desire from regular citizens to be recognized by political leaders. For instance, in the United States, "high levels of inequality, coupled with high levels of distrust, apparently strengthened resentment towards economic and political elites, providing the right environment for Trump's "drain the swamp" rhetoric." Interestingly, there is empirical truth to some of the issues identified by populists (on the left and right), coupled with misinformation. There is truth to concerns about economic inequality in the US, for instance, as "a greater share of the nation's aggregate income is now going to upper-income households and the share going to middle- and lower-income households is falling ... [and] the share of American adults who live in middle-income households has decreased from 61% in 1971 to 51% in 2019." However, populist politics is also prone to misinformation and baseless conspiracy theories, which will be investigated more thoroughly in the Trumpian Populism section. Thus, populist politics recognizes citizens' real disillusionment with their national politics and the liberal democratic state, while also engaging with unsubstantiated issues.

Populist politics emerge through a disillusionment with the established liberal democratic state and seek to provide an alternative governance that meaningfully represents 'the people'. Elitist and technocratic impulses of the state are met with oppositional political strategies of the populist, who attempt to appeal to common sense, emotionality, and moralism. There is empirical validity to the shortcomings of the liberal democratic establishment, yet misinformation continues to pervade populist rhetoric. There is more to be said about knowledge dissemination and misinformation in the following sections.

1.3 Applications to Trumpian Populism

Donald Trump can be considered a populist leader because his political style and governance meets a few aforementioned criteria: recognition of and exclusive claim to represent 'the people' of a nation, anti-pluralism, and moralism. For instance, Trump tweeted the phrase 'the people' roughly 609 times between January 27th, 2011 and January 3rd, 2021, often making sweeping claims about a population. He clearly speaks to, and about, a certain group of people in the US, which he claims to represent politically. Trump has claimed that "[he] alone can fix the broken system in Washington… promising to serve as the 'voice' of the 'forgotten men and women of our country."' At his inauguration, Trump declared that "January 20th, 2017, will be remembered as the day the people became the rulers of this nation again."

Further, the January 6th, 2021 riots at the Capitol in Washington DC demonstrate an exclusive claim to represent the people, which extends far enough to even make claims to delegitimize the 2020 presidential election results. The Trump campaign and its supporters went to court over the election results in 6 US states as an attempt to reverse the election results. This example clearly shows a lack of dedication to plural and tolerant politics, to the point of contesting what was considered a free and fair election. This mirrors the concept that the populist "may not win 100 percent of the

vote, but they lay claim to 100 percent of the support of good, hardworking folks who have been exploited by the establishment."

Lastly, Trumpian rhetoric is famously values-based and moralistic. This is exemplified in a tweet from the former president: "The Governor of Michigan should give a little and put out the fire. These are very good people, but they are angry. They want their lives back again, safely! See them, talk to them, make a deal." The narrative that his following consists of good people that are disillusioned with establishment politics, is quintessential populist rhetoric. A morally righteous and disenfranchised people are being recognized and advocated for by the former president. Thus, Trumpian populism proves to be a useful case study for populism, and in particular, radical right populism. The paradox of populism, in which populist leaders "[reinforce], or [offer] another variety of the very exclusion and the usurpation of the state that it most opposes," is also quite relevant to Donald Trump's presidency.

2 ANALYSIS

Populism fundamentally claims to be a liberatory and democratic force in the face of political oppression. However, do populists in power actually rule for 'the people,' or do their policies end up mirroring the very technocracy it positions as its opposition? Jan-Werner Müller writes that "populism in power brings about, reinforces, or offers another variety of the very exclusion and the usurpation of the state that it most opposes in the reigning establishment it seeks to replace." Specifically, "what the 'old establishment' or 'corrupt, immoral elites' supposedly have always done, the populists will also end up doing- only, one would have thought, without guilt and with a supposedly democratic justification." In this way, populism can be "deployed to their own advantage by the very traditional elites that 'people power' was supposed to sweep away in democratic revolution." Hofstadter recognizes a similar phenomenon in his historical work on US populism in the progressive era. Namely, he writes that, "one of the ironic problems confronting [populist and progressive] reformers around the turn of the century was that the very activities they pursued in attempting to defend to restore the individualistic values they admired brought them closer to the techniques of organizations they feared." Essentially, these scholars amongst others articulate paradoxical inconsistencies between the ideals of populism as a liberatory and radically democratic ideology and the actualized populist governance.

In order to make sense of this contradiction, it is important to consider what kinds of incentive structures exist within a liberal democratic political establishment. The populist faces different pressures and motivations during a campaign, or in a state of mobilization, than they face as a leader within a government structure. As a result, it is vital to recontextualize the populist within a system of governance to clarify the aforementioned paradox. Specifically, how does an institution such as the state deal with criticism? What is at stake when a state is criticized? This is the point in which frameworks for understanding social and political power become important to extend understanding of populism. Departing quickly from this notion, as Müller does, is analytically insufficient. However, looking at the work of Michel Foucault can resolve the logical tension existing in Müller's argument.

2.1 Constructing a Foucauldian Framework

There are three main ideas from the work of Michel Foucault that are essential in understanding state incentive structures and the general ways in which state power functions. Namely, the concepts of power-knowledge, domination, and governmentality together build a Foucauldian framework which can be employed to make sense of populism's paradox.

Firstly, Foucault theorizes knowledge and power as integrated with one another and mutually reinforcing phenomena. There is no real separation between the concepts and they ought to be considered together. He coined the term 'pouvoir-savoir,' or 'power-knowledge,' where knowledge is created, influenced, spread, etc. power resides. Essentially, the term attempts to call attention to "the involvement of knowledge in the maintenance of power relations." Conceiving of power and knowledge in this interconnected way is also a basic foundational concept in the tradition of critical theory. Notably, domination is a conceptual subset of power relations. It is a situation in which asymmetrical power relations become fixed, where power relations are generally considered by Foucault to be mobile, and fluid. In other words, when power becomes concentrated and maintained within certain people, institutions, organizations, etc. a dominating relationship can exist. There are three major types of power according to Foucault: Sovereign Power, Disciplinary Power, and Biopower. This framework straddles all three types, as Foucault conceives of their presence (at differing degrees) in all institutions, apparatuses, and states.

Further, Foucault applies this conceptualization of power to real institutions, such as states. He theorizes the state to necessarily contain regulatory systems that maintain and establish order, and arguably, dominance. Specifically, the state "requires an apparatus that will ensure that the population, which is seen as the sources and the root, as it were, of the state's power and wealth, will work properly, in the right place, and on the right objects." In other words, political power relations require consistent upkeep and management. The state as an institution requires intentional systems that work

to reproduce and maintain existing power relations, in which it benefits. Fundamentally, "the essential function of society or the State ... is to take control of life, to manage it." This is specifically a dominating power relation because the state intends to make sure that the population functions in a specific manner, which is necessarily a rigid goal that is opposed to the free movement of typical power.

Foucault begins to define the state through its managerial and dominating nature. He writes that the state consists of "a regime of multiple governmentalities." The concept of governmentality is a portmanteau that combines the terms government and rationality in order to express instances of "activity meant to shape, guide, or affect the conduct of people." Essentially, governmentality and the act of governance works to influence the actions of a group of people. Order is the result and ultimate goal of governmentality and state management. Foucault writes that "order is what remains when everything that is prohibited has in fact been prevented." Thus, movement and "circulation [are] ... the essential problem of security." An order is reached once movement of power and knowledge is controlled and fixed. Ultimately, the identification of power as connected to knowledge, domination as a rigid concentration of power, and governmentality as a mechanism for state management proves useful in contextualizing populist leaders in power, which will be investigated in the following section.

2.2 Applying a Foucauldian Framework: Trumpian Populism

The core theoretical claim of this section includes the following: the populist project aims to position the populist leader as the primary mediator of political knowledge. From this position, the populist works to control both the source and substance of political knowledge that is communicated to citizens which, in turn, allows for the concentration of power in the state. Power, as Foucault conceives of it, parallels the control and movement of knowledge. When the state encounters criticism, such as populist challenges to the liberal establishment, it works to neutralize this opposition through knowledge control apparatuses. The ultimate consequence of this phenomenon is governmentality and management of a citizenry. This creates a self-reproducing system in which the state maintains its power over the nation.

Firstly, regarding the source of knowledge, populists such as Trump simultaneously work to become the major site of political knowledge for their constituency and to limit other competing sources of information. Like the use of Twitter for political communication and communication of the 'fake news' narrative, in the case of Trump.. Many followers of Trump look to his Twitter account as an access point to learn what is happening in their national politics. This account was not only used as a personal platform, but frequently included information about current US politics. For instance, Trump tweeted from this account referencing the Speaker of the House, Nancy Pelosi, 362 times and used his Twitter platform to engage with the Supreme Leader of North Korea, Kim Jong-un, to say: "[w]ill someone from his depleted and food starved regime please inform him that I too have a Nuclear Button, but it is a much bigger & more powerful one than his, and my Button works!" These tweets were communicated to the account's 80.3 million followers. Not only did Trump have a considerable number of followers, but this rise in attention to his Twitter platform was accompanied by a rejection of traditional mainstream media sources. Media sources, which were historically sites of knowledge transfer for US citizens about politics, have undergone a significant delegitimization for Trump's sympathizers. Trump's quintessential 'fake news' campaign has led many of his followers to turn their attention towards him for political knowledge instead of "mainstream news organizations [which] have experienced a considerable decline in public confidence." This is a departure from the typical style of establishment leaders. While most politicians, regardless of political ideology, attempt to create convincing political narratives, few actively work to discredit and antagonize mainstream media as Trump has.

Fake news is defined as "fabricated information that has the format of news content but not the editorial standards and practices of legitimate journalism." Note that there is some empirical truth being referenced by Trump in the recognition of 'fake news' and misinformation in a rapidly advancing digital age. Take for instance a study by Statista media researcher, Amy Watson, which found in March 2020 that "around 47 percent of surveyed U.S. adults had encountered a lot or at least some news about the coronavirus which seemed completely made up, highlighting the issue of fake news circulation and unreputable sources seeking to capitalize on the public's need for news and updates in times of crisis." Misinformation is not unique to the Covid-19 crisis, but is an intrinsic feature of our modern technological society.

The vetting processes for creating legitimate and rigorous news reporting has been challenged by the rise of social media platforms, in which anyone can create, spread, etc. news information. Anyone with a Facebook account can make a post about current events that is factually untrue, and it is available to be seen by all of their friends. There is far more information existing online than ever before, but again, without the same fact-checking and validity standards as traditional media sources. However, the claim of 'fake news' by Trump while referencing a real crisis in news

media, does not do the important work of creating critical media consumers. Rather than encouraging critical and intentional consumption of media, the 'fake news' campaign has only worked to contribute to the confusion, and lead followers of Trump to view less and less sources as credible, while increasingly looking to him for political knowledge. Instead of reading articles from the New York Times, one might log onto Twitter to see what the president has Tweeted today. This phenomenon works to establish Trump on Twitter as a primary mediator and source of political knowledge.

It is also noteworthy that Twitter was the chosen platform for political communication by Trump's team and administration. Not only is it one of the most popular social media platforms, but it also has strategic communication features. Namely, "because of its character limitation, Twitter structurally disallows the communication of detailed and sophisticated messages… a Tweet may be clever or witty, but it cannot be complex." The nuance of typical political reporting is not well captured when shifting from article-based communication to the simplification of a Tweet. Many see this as a way that Trump strips away the 'political correctness' or the niceties often seen in political communication and speaks in headlines. This is another way in which Trump can claim to speak for the 'the people,' who are often alienated from the complex jargon and euphemisms used by a typical politician in a liberal democracy. Instead of consuming lengthy and nuanced pieces full of politicalese, Trump's following looks to him for quick snippets and headlines to understand current political news.

Further, populist ideology tends to reject the need for political debate. If the populist is an instantiation of 'the people,' who are the legitimate political stakeholders of a nation, then debate is a waste of time. The populist need not quibble about policy when they are legitimated as the true and sole representation of a nation's citizenry. Knowledge mediation, in particular, is a necessary precondition for the elimination of debate. Ultimately, "'real Americans' can be done with the media and have direct access (or, rather, the illusion of direct contact with) a man who is not just a celebrity; the self-declared 'Hemingway of 140 characters' [who] uniquely tells it like it is." If power and knowledge are intertwined like Foucault theorizes they are, then Trump sequesters more and more power as he is able to be the almost exclusive point of access to knowledge for citizens about politics. Lastly, I do not intend to conceptualize knowledge transfer as solely a top-down phenomenon, which would be far too simplistic. Knowledge does not have merely a one-way movement from those in political power down to their constituencies. Rather, it might be most useful to understand Trump's strategy as an attempt to consolidate sites of knowledge transfer from multiple parties and to multiple parties.

The populist also works to influence the substance or content of political knowledge in the state. For instance, conspiracy theories are "not a curious addition to the populist rhetoric; they are rooted in and emerge from the very logic of populism itself." The anti-pluralism and emotional appeal over policy and logical appeal uniquely facilitate misinformation for populists. Essentially, "what distinguishes democratic politicians from populists is that the former make representative claims in the form of something like hypotheses that can be empirically disproven on the basis of the actual results of regular procedures and institutions like elections." For example, regarding the 2020 presidential election, Trump "retweeted a baseless report that the voting-machine system had 'deleted 2.7 million Trump votes nationwide,"' among other false statements regarding the integrity of the election. Further, the 'birtherism' conspiracy also exemplifies how misinformation was strategically weaponized in favor of Trump. He famously "embraced the birther theory wholesale, wielding his trademark innuendos." The birthplace of former president, Barack Obama, has been substantiated numerous times (Honolulu, HI). Yet, questions of this conspiracy continued to surface amongst Trump supporters despite the factual evidence. Ironically, Trump has tweeted the phrase 'fake news' 940 times.

Trump also utilizes the 'drain the swamp' rhetoric to address the real disillusionment of average people with the technocratic tendencies of the US liberal democracy. In many liberal democracies, including the US, there is an "increasing perception of corruption in public services – and the impunity enjoyed by those who profit from it – [which] is increasingly pushing countries towards populist politicians who promise to change the system and break the cycle of corruption and privilege." Populists, including Trump, are not the only politicians or parties with anti-corruption or anti-elite platforms, but nevertheless capitalize on this stance. Simultaneously, Trump "has openly accepted alleged 'emoluments,' foreign and domestic government payments and benefits forbidden by the U.S. Constitution" and has faced investigation of "tax dodges, illegal campaign contributions, and improper foreign contributions to his inaugural committee." The very issues recognized in 'drain the swamp' rhetoric are perpetuated by the Trump administration. In fact, Trump's cabinet consisted of "17 millionaires, 2 centimillionaires and 1 billionaire," and was "the most wealthy group of people who have served in a presidential Cabinet in history." Nevertheless, Trump's approval rating stayed consistently between 30-40% throughout his presidency. The inconsistencies between his populist ideology and rhetoric in his campaign and the realities of his governance did not meaningfully impact his political influence. Rather, it is arguable that the continuation of 'the swamp' has seen a "democratic justification," just as

Müller theorizes.

From this, populism, in its radical right flavor, is a democratic justification and governing strategy that allows establishment politics to continue but with dissent essentially neutralized. Trump can simultaneously critique 'the swamp' and technocratic liberal state, while mirroring that same governance with an ultra-rich cabinet. The issues of the liberal democratic state can persist, but under the guise of the popular rule of 'the people.' Again, the state employs mechanisms of management in order to govern the state towards a democratically justified order, which describes the role that populism plays as a democratic justification. Populists such as Donald Trump, strategically position themselves to be exclusive sources of political information, which they can then manipulate in their favor. This is distinct from typical political rhetoric, which attempts to be convincing yet does not claim exclusivity and typically depends on empirical knowledge and logic. Sources and mediators of knowledge also wield significant power. This power is not the free-flowing and symmetrical relation, but rather concentrates in favor of the populist and the state. The 'populist in power' can thereby be theorized alongside state mechanisms of control and management. Populist rhetoric that was once critical of the state, becomes mechanized in favor of its domination. The real issues recognized by those sympathetic to populism, such "institutionalized corruption of special interests, lobbyists and big-money donors" (also known as 'the swamp'), become essentially neutralized. Populist sympathizers' issues with liberal democracies, including inequality, corruption, etc. are recognized by the populist and feel deeply seen. However, the populist does not need to actually accomplish the tasks set out in the ideal populist ideology. Rather, the ideology becomes a veil over existing and often contradictory politics of the enduring status quo.

The concept of governmentality is the last piece necessary to clarify the paradox of populism. Populists such as Trump play this mediatory role in which power-knowledge is concentrated asymmetrically and thereby capitalized on. The state always has an incentive to maintain this kind of power relation in favor of itself as a self-producing and self-sufficient system. Populism, while in theory challenges this power relation, ends up reinforcing this same structure because the incentive continues to exist when they govern. Populism, as an ideology, has strong roots in the ideals of democracy, that the government ought to work for and listen to the needs of the average person. Behind this guise, however, the realities of populist governance gain a democratic justification even when it works to uphold establishment politics. The logical end to Foucault's analysis in Discipline and Punish is the creation of docile and subjected bodies that no longer threaten power relations. He concludes in this genealogy, that technologies of power lead to the ultimate end of obedience and submission of subjects.

A similar end can be drawn from this analysis but directed towards the political mind. The political fervor that demands liberation from the inadequacies of the liberal state is consolidated by the populist and ultimately squashed. Disciplinary power of the state "fixes ... arrests or regulates movements ... it must neutralize the effects of counter-power that spring from them and which form a resistance to power that wishes to dominate it: agitations, revolts, spontaneous organizations, coalitions- anything that may establish horizontal conjunctions." Thus, the populist paradox is no coincidence or accident, but rather demonstrates state power maintenance towards order. That order can only be reached when the threat that populist ideology poses to the existing state is fully negated.

Lastly, it is very difficult to disentangle populism from its host ideology. One could argue that Trump's authoritarian or illiberal impulses could better explain his role as a nexus of political knowledge dissemination than his populist ideology. However, a key component of Müller's populist paradox is the 'democratic justification' that it provides to the host ideology. Again, radical right populism occurs in the context of a liberal democracy that is seen as becoming too distant from the regular citizen. There is not a rejection of the democratic project itself. While the populist in power might take actions that lead to democratic erosion, it is done in a way that has a popular and/or democratic justification. From this, the authoritarian or fascist tendencies of the radical right require a guise of populism to be successful in the liberal democratic political context. Thus, while it is notoriously difficult to separate the aspects of politics that are populist compared to leftist, socialist, fascist, conservative, etc., in this case, populism is a necessary component. An analysis that seeks to understand Trump as a site of political knowledge without considerations of populism ideology and the connection between the populist and 'the people' would be incomplete. The study of populism continues to be tremendously salient to Trumpian politics.

3 CONCLUSIONS AND LIMITATIONS

Ultimately, populism scholarship ought to consider populism as a mechanism of power maintenance by the existing state. While this is a complicated conclusion, it is insufficient to continue considering populism only from a 'bottom-up' perspective, which decontextualizes populist leaders and isolates them from the state and its apparatuses. Rather, Foucault's philosophy provides a framework for reconceptualizing the phenomenon through a clarifying and critical framework. Roger Eatwell and Matthew Goodwin expertly recognize this gap in existing scholarship in their text

National Populism; there has been a disproportionate focus on the 'demand side' of populist politics rather than the 'supply side.' This analysis only just begins to understand the complexities of populist supply and is a call for further critical contextualization of populism, especially in the Trump case.

From this, citizens ought to be suspicious of democratic justifications for policy and the suppression of political consciousness like that seen in the Trump case. The insidious impact of Müller's populist paradox is that some of the same issues identified by the populist are continued under the guise of populism. The populist neutralizes the very political uproar that supports them, and the liberal state is allowed to maintain its order and the distribution of power-knowledge in a political community without the same critique. Populists recognize many of the failures of the liberal democratic state without meaningfully caring to solve them, hollowing out the liberatory and radical potential of populist politics. Rather, the state in power seeks to maintain its power and manage dissent directed towards itself. It develops mechanisms to release the civic frustration but not in a way that challenges the asymmetrical distribution of power in which it benefits. Further, this analysis makes a case that the populist ought not be thought of as exterior to the political establishment. Again, there is explanatory value in conceiving of populist politics as a mechanism for the liberal democratic state. Populism may fluctuate in popularity and attention, but fundamentally it remains hollowed, as a "permanent shadow of representative politics."

Nevertheless, this article is limited in its focus on the application of the proposed framework on populism cases. While the Trumpian populism section provides a tremendously necessary exercise of the article's theoretical contribution, there are many diverse cases of populism. Populism studies are constantly confronted with the issue of forming theory that is informed by vastly differing political realities. Because of this, more research to employ this framework on different cases of populism is necessary to test its usefulness and accuracy beyond the Trump case. Moreover, this article does not focus on left-wing populism and is thus, incomplete. Further research in this area is undoubtedly imperative. There are also limitations inherent to theoretical work being done about state theories. Each state is a different entity with a complicated and multi-dimensional history. How can we theorize about a state in general given the diversity of actual states? This is not a unique conundrum, but rather is inherent to much of the theoretical political science work being done. Again, there is a need for more expansive research in this field, which could work to include leftist populism.

4 EDITOR'S NOTES

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Sexualized by Merit Willey

Visions for Japanese Society: An Examination of Japanese Postwar Occupation Period Film

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Abstract

By following the films of directors Akira Kurosawa (黒澤明), Yasujiro Ozu (小津安二郎), Masaki Kobayashi (小林正樹), and Shohei Imamura (今村昌平) around occupation period Japan, unified visions for Japanese society are formed as it transitions from wartime into the postwar era. Each of these films conveys a sense of rapid change in society, external pressures and foreign influence, a daily struggle, and immediate postwar suffering. Not only can these films be seen across a wide variety of styles, but they also each approach these issues with immediacy and show tentative outlooks for how Japan functioned and felt for most people in the postwar period. This difference in style can be contributed to the director's diverse backgrounds and what they were influenced by in the time that began making films, which further complicate our understanding of Japanese society as it transitioned into the postwar era.

1 INTRODUCTION

Film is a medium that allows the audience to connect to situations and ideas differently than written text. Specifically, concerning this paper, film has a way of highlighting aspects to better our understanding of the occupation period. It gives us a different perspective on the material than in a book or newspaper. Akira Kurosawa (黒澤明), Yasujiro Ozu (小津安二郎), Masaki Kobayashi (小林正樹), and Shohei Imamura (今村昌平) are key directors during the occupation period and are crucial in more deeply interacting with various interpretations of the time. They highlight ideals, attitudes, and actions encompassed within their films which makes them crucial as sources of knowledge. While each of these directors has distinctive styles and artistic focuses within their films, the filmmakers present a unified vision for Japanese society as it transitions from wartime into the postwar era. Each conveys a sense of rapid change in the society, external pressures and foreign influence, and a daily struggle and postwar suffering, though they are depicted a little differently by each director. They are united by these common themes that are conveyed but are divided by what the directors chose to focus on in their films. Their difference in perspective presented in their films may be affected by their difference in background as people, and the period they grew up and began making films.

2 BACKGROUND

This paper focuses on films surrounding the occupation period of Japan, also known as the Allied Occupation of Japan (連合国占領下の日本). This period starts at the conclusion of WWII in 1945 and goes up until the signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, which returned Japan's sovereignty in 1952. The occupation effort was supposed to be international but was largely run by U.S. forces under General Douglas MacArthur. These forces, led by General MacArthur, were known as the Supreme Command of Allied Powers (SCAP). SCAP was responsible for overseeing the new constitution's promulgation in 1947, increased land reforms, changing the education system, breaking up the zaibatsu (business conglomerates), and changing the emperor's position to largely a ceremonial status. Historians have found it useful to divide the occupation period into three parts: the initial phase to punish and reform Japan after the war, the "Reverse Course" which shifted the focus to suppressing dissent and created efforts towards building up the Japanese economy, and the signing of a formal peace treaty and the creation of an enduring military alliance (U.S.-Japan Security Treaty) with the United States[1]. It is this period of intense change that these films were created and reflecting upon.

Focusing on films from Akira Kurosawa, Yasujiro Ozu, Masaki Kobayashi, and Shohei Imamura gives a large glimpse at the narratives being furthered within

Japanese film at this time. The three Kurosawa films that I focus on in this paper are *Drunken Angel* (1948)[2], *Stray Dog* (1949)[3], and *Seven Samurai* (1954)[4]. *Drunken Angel* was the first released of all the films I am examining in this paper. *Drunken Angel* follows the story of a doctor, named Sanada, who treats a member of the local yakuza, named Matsunaga, after he was shot by a member of a rival gang. Sanada diagnoses Matsunaga with tuberculosis during this encounter and throughout the film they become friends. The climax of this film comes when Matsunaga fights with a former friend, who was also a member of the yakuza, and is stabbed and killed. This film ends with Sanada upset that Matsunaga wasted his life when he was beginning to turn it around. *Stray Dog* takes place amidst a hot summer in Tokyo when Murakami, a new detective, has his pistol stolen. Murakami goes undercover to try and find it on the illicit arms market but none of his leads come up with anything. Meanwhile, his gun is being used to kill people throughout the city and the person perpetrating the crimes is identified as a man named Yusa. Murakami eventually catches him, retrieves his gun, and arrests him. This film ends with Satō, Murakami's boss, telling him that he will become less attached to cases as he goes forward into the future. Finally, *Seven Samurai* is Kurosawa's most notable jidaigeki (時代劇), period film, that is further categorized as a Sengoku-jidai (戦國時代), as it was set during the Sengoku or "warring states" period of Japanese history. This film follows the story of a farming village that hired seven rōnin (浪人), "masterless samurai," to combat the groups of bandits that steal their crops after harvest season. One of the most impactful parts of this movie is the dialogue at the end when one of the remaining rōnin says (when translated to English), "In the end, we lost this battle too. The victory belongs to the peasants, not to us" as the surviving samurai look at the funeral sites of the other rōnin who were hired[4]. The first two of these films were released during the occupation period whereas the last one was released shortly after the occupation period ended.

I focus on four Ozu films in this paper: *Late Spring* (1949)[5], *Tokyo Story* (1953)[6], *Equinox Flower* (1958)[7], and *Good Morning* (1959)[8]. *Late Spring* follows the story of a widowed father and his only daughter. The father's sister believes it is time for his daughter to marry and the father sets up a meeting for an arranged marriage for his daughter. She ends up agreeing to the marriage and the end of the movie shows the father's overwhelming loneliness. *Tokyo Story* follows an older retired couple visiting their children and their families in Tokyo. The children, except for their daughter-in-law, did not make time for their parents and instead decided to send them to an onsen (温泉), or hot springs, in Atami. Shortly after they return to Tokyo, the older couple decides to return home as to not be a burden, and on their way back the mother falls sick. She passes away which "forces" the family to come to Onomichi and the funeral. After the funeral, only the daughter-in-law remains but soon after leaves the father figure alone. *Equinox Flower* follows the story of a father who works as a businessman and is giving advice to his friend's daughter. Little did he know that the advice he was giving to his friend's daughter also applied to his daughter, but he took a much different stance. His wife and daughter set up a trick to get the father in agreeing to his daughter's marriage. He refuses to go to the wedding but then goes to visit the couple after they wed in Hiroshima. Finally, in *Good Morning*, two young boys decide to protest by not talking until their parents and grandparents purchase a TV set. This film looks at the world through the eyes of the two children and makes a poke at postwar consumerism in Japan. Both Akira Kurosawa and Yasujiro Ozu are known as innovators within Japanese film and are perceived to be part of the cannon for film within the country.

The Kobayashi film that I focus on is *The Human Condition* (1959)[9]. I look at Part I of the trilogy which is often titled *No Greater Love* and is based on the first two volumes of the much larger six-volume novel by Junpei Gomikawa. The overall trilogy follows the character of Kaji, a pacifist who goes between the roles of a labor camp supervisor, an Imperial Army soldier, and then eventually a Soviet prisoner of war. Throughout this journey, Kaji questions his morals and tests the strength of his resolve to stay true to his values. The first part begins with Kaji's marriage to his love Michiko. They move to a mining operation assignment in Manchuria to receive an exemption for military service and begin to make changes for the Chinese prisoners that he oversees. Kaji implements humane practices to improve both labor conditions and productivity, which results in clashes with the bureaucracy and those with power in the camp, such as the foremen and the Kenpeitai, imperial military police. Several prisoners in the camp are killed because of attempts to escape. Ultimately his efforts to grant autonomy to the POWs are undermined by scheming officials, resulting in the electrocution of several prisoners and the beheading of others accused of attempted escape. When Kaji tries to fight against this, he is tortured by the people who he went against with power in the camp and is then drafted into the army when previously promised otherwise.

Finally, the Imamura film that I examine below is *Vengeance is Mine* (1979)[10], which is also the latest film released of the ones I have chosen to discuss. This film follows Iwao Enokizu, a charismatic serial killer who is seeing his life through a series of flashback sequences throughout the movie. The screenplay was adapted from a novel based upon the Japanese serial killer Akira Nishiguchi and the story follows a fictionalized version of what may have happened. Many different narratives

are interplaying to show how this individual, born into a very Catholic family became someone who is killing without remorse. He tricks and befriends people for his gain and kills them after they are no longer useful to him. He is eventually turned in to the police by a prostitute and the narrative jumps back to the present. This film ends with the result of Enokizu being executed and cremated. The last scene shows Enokizu's father and wife traveling to the peak of a mountain to spread his ashes, however, when his father throws Enokizu's bones, they remain hanging in the air. This film was not released during the occupation period but responds to it in very interesting ways, including blatant violence, as it was able to pass the occupation censors in ways that a few of the others were unable to.

3 SHARED DEPICTIONS ACROSS FILMS

Kurosawa, Ozu, Kobayashi, and Imamura present a somewhat unified vision for Japanese society as it transitions from wartime into the postwar era. Each film is united by how rapid change in Japanese society is conveyed during this period. One of these rapid changes are the SCAP policies imposed and the increase of civil and human rights. In *Drunken Angel*, the doctor gives a lecture on his increased civil rights and in *Stray Dog*, the woman that Murakami follows at the beginning says that he is "violating her civil rights" in a very mocking and condescending way. And while these new policies were used as a point of humor in a few of the films, it is inarguable that there was tension and drama that accompanied society changing around people going about their daily lives. A sense of modernity, or cultural modernism, was also developed due to society changing so rapidly. An example of this is in Ozu's *Good Morning* when the young boys always go over to the neighbor's house to watch TV or how washing machines become increasingly more prominent within the community pictured. These fast changes played a large role in how rapid the change in society was conveyed. Another way this is demonstrated is through the undermining of authority. This is seen in *Late Spring* in reference to the younger daughter who tells her father that they can find their own love and that it is their right to do so. Another example is the need to trick the father in *Equinox Flower* for his blessing, despite his daughter and her partner's ability to marry without his consent or approval. These rapid changes led to nostalgia, for all ages were reminiscent of the society they were a part of and support of the direction it was headed.

Another way that these films provide a united vision is through how external pressures and foreign influence are conveyed. In *Drunken Angel*, there is a strong American Influence as the gangsters themselves are meant to represent Americans and the Occupation Forces, even so far as using makeup and western clothes for the yakuza to appear that way. More outward influences are the cabaret, the American style of music playing within it, and the use of roman letters to mark it. This film indirectly and directly critiques the government's policies and their relationship with SCAP and occupation forces. In Kurosawa's film *Seven Samurai*, American influence is criticized in the character and actions of the bandits who take from the common people whenever they want; the peasants say they "can kill defeated samurai but not bandits," further drawing out that analogy that they can destroy the system of social structure but cannot avoid foreign influence and pressure from the United States. External pressures and foreign influence are also conveyed through the use of English in the films. This can be seen in nearly all of them, from the young boy studying English in *Tokyo Story* to the prostitute using American slang in *Stray Dog*, to Murakami to Enokizu's use of English and that he was an interpreter for occupation forces. All of these elements are seen to present a united vision of how external pressures and foreign influence are conveyed in the transition between wartime and postwar periods.

One of the final ways that these filmmakers are united in how they convey their vision is the depiction of daily struggle and postwar suffering. Both Ozu's *Late Spring* and *Tokyo Story* end with great loneliness portrayed by the fathers of each story while watching the water and tides. Many of these films also show some sort of compromise, during the transition and occupation, whether that be generational differences causing conflict which must be overcome or rather, given in to, changing social status, or changing ideals; the hiding of emotions conveys this daily struggle. In Ozu's film, the style of females covering their faces and angling them down is very distinct, reinforcing this idea but also portraying a closing barrier between people at this time as the war itself was so emotional for many people.

Quite a few of the films deal with trust, or lack thereof, in some fashion. This is in part to show the complexity of the time and what people were having to manage, as well as the injustices that people would have to overcome. Part of these injustices that led to daily suffering were food shortages and disease. This can be viewed in *Drunken Angel* as the doctor goes around treating those who suffer from war illnesses, such as tuberculosis, then going to the black market to buy more alcohol for himself. Food shortages can be seen in *The Human Condition* as Kaji's wife is using rations for food and flour whereas others steal it. These aspects play greatly into the struggle that everyday individuals had to experience.

Exploitation and racial hostility also fall within this category of postwar suffering and struggle that people would be confronted with daily. I use the term exploitation in reference to not only the labor camps seen in *The Human Condition* but the exploitation of certain Japanese

ideals taken by SCAP and the occupation forces, which were representing new ideals but being presented as prior beliefs. For example, in *Equinox Flower*, the father says to "do as you wish, you don't have to listen" to his daughter in response to her wanting to get married. This interaction is in response to an occupation policy taking away the power of the family unit from the patriarch and making gender relations more equitable. Even though this is in response to a changed policy, the father tries to play it off as something that he would have already believed for everyone other than his children as shown through his support of his daughter's friend's fake relationship that he believed to be real.

One of the aspects of failed reintegration, a daily struggle shared with many people, is when Murakami wandered around in his military uniform after being told to look helpless and desperate enough to need a gun. This also plays into "humanism" used in *The Human Condition* and forced perceptions or beliefs on society. By not addressing certain issues or aspects related to the war, denial and failure filled this void and worsened the "culture of defeat" and kyodatsu, or post-war malaise, experienced by the larger society.

The final way that filmmakers have a united vision of postwar suffering is the struggle of war justification versus criticism of the war. Large groups of people looked to justify their actions after the war to give the fighting a purpose however, an even larger group of people denounced many of the facets and institutions that contributed to the war, such as the military and imperialism. It was a popular rebellion against the status quo during the war and an embrace of the occupation forces who looked towards demilitarization as the main objective. It is in this sentiment, these ambiguities, and multiple attitudes that are present in the films that the directors unite their depiction of daily struggle and postwar suffering in Japan.

4 SOCIAL ANALYSIS OF DIVISIONS

A division in the unified vision of the transition between wartime and the postwar period is what the directors chose to focus on in their films. Kurosawa and Imamura are very similar in that they did not shy away from showing the "underbelly of Japanese society" and the parts of life which would have been widely hidden or out of focus for certain audiences. By making it a focal point of their films, the focus towards lower classes and social outcasts is given attention. This would not have been highlighted as much in Ozu films as his focal point or character was, often, of a higher class viewing how they were dealing with the transition of power; whereas, Kurosawa and Imamura provide very human, messy, or unsettling characters and scenes set within the postwar society.

Another division is seen between Kobayashi and Imamura as they focus heavily on morality or moral confusion, ethical dilemmas, and implications lasting long after that given scene or moment in time. Kobayashi places a lot of pressure on morality and ethics of violence within *The Human Condition* as Kaji navigates his relationship and the role he plays in the actions taken towards the prisoners of war and prostitutes as well as the military and his superiors in Manchuria and Japan. Kobayashi presses the idea that nothing is simply "black and white" or clear-cut when some people are fighting or protesting the system in place and others are either complacent or encourage it. Imamura highlights the larger implications of these situations more. The final scene of *Vengeance is Mine* struck me as one full of implications. Enokizu's bones freezing when his father and wife threw them off the mountain painted the picture that his father and wife would never be truly free of Enokizu or the actions that he had taken in his lifetime. His bones froze and stayed in their minds to remind them that they played a part in what he became, and that burden would remain with them. In this case, Imamura gives implications not only for the crimes committed by Enokizu during his lifetime but also with the people around him.

Kurosawa and Kobayashi also have a unique deviation as they both show that regular people are capable of committing crimes and violence in bad situations. One of the greatest examples of this is in *Stray Dog* in the second to last scene where Murakami and Yusa become indistinguishable, and the audience realizes that Murakami could have very easily been in the same place as Yusa found himself, as they were both former soldiers. It is also within *Stray Dog* that Murakami strongly holds the belief that there is "no such thing as a bad man, just bad situations" which also furthers the idea that no one was safe from experiencing violence[3]. Detective Sato at the end of the film also states that there are many more guys like Yusa, implying that this story is bound to repeat itself during the occupation. In Kobayashi's *The Human Condition*, this capability is seen when viewing the character of Chen throughout the first two parts of the film. Initially, Chen is loyal to Kaji and the ideals that he was trying to impose within the labor camp in Manchuria but becomes swayed by a prostitute. As a result, he becomes part of the plot to release prisoners from the camp and kills himself by throwing himself against the electric fence as the plan fell apart. This is a character who was coerced into picking a side and forced to act against the Japanese, no matter his relationship with Kaji. His actions were supported by the supervisors of the labor camp, but the moment they were not, Chen was implicated as an enemy and paid the consequences because of this lost trust.

Ozu provides a slightly different outlook from the shared vision too as he focuses on generational divisions, Japanese domestic life, dissolution of the tradi-

tional Japanese family, and domestic disputes. These are not nearly as common in the films of the other directors though interesting family dynamics could also be examined in Imamura's *Vengeance is Mine*. By focusing on the family unit, Ozu provides a different perspective than Kurosawa and Kobayashi specifically and focuses on a class dynamic that was undergoing large changes as occupation policy was set in place. To sum up, each of these filmmakers shows a slight divide from the unified vision of the transition between wartime and the postwar period based on their choice of where to let the audience's focus lay.

The perspectives of the filmmakers are fundamentally the same which is fascinating to view with how each film was influenced by censorship from the occupation. That being said, there are some differences in their perspectives, but they convey a very similar mood and feeling. Each director had a slightly different relationship to western cinema and Hollywood conventions. Kurosawa was strongly influenced by western cinema not only in the conventions he used but also in the stories to which he gave light. Ozu, on the opposite side of the spectrum, did not conform to Hollywood conventions and standards, but instead, created his own to better get his story across. Each director with their films had to abide by the censorship imposed within SCAP policy, but each would push the limits of what they could show or add things that they could get away with, in their way. This can be viewed in Kurosawa's *Drunken Angel* with the inclusion of the cabaret, roman letters, American music, and clothing and makeup that the actors wore. The inclusion of prostitutes and black-market liquor would have also not been strongly liked by the SCAP, forcing changes upon these films, but they were not made to be changed. Ozu's *Late Spring* also used roman letters in the form of the Coca-Cola sign which could also be seen in *Equinox Flower* at the bar where the father and his employee go to see his friend's daughter. *Vengeance is Mine* came at a period where occupation censorship was becoming more lenient and so Imamura gets away with more explicit references towards foreign influence in Japan and his opinion on it. This is examined in Enokizu's time with the occupation and Imamura shows occupation vehicles with American flags and uniforms accosting people in the fields and seducing and leading away a woman. English phrases are also used in this film, but short phrases would escape censorship here and there such as the American slang the prostitute uses in *Stray Dog* or the children speaking to each other or doing homework in Ozu's *Good Morning*.

For both Kurosawa's *Drunken Angel* and *Stray Dog*, final scenes that did not match the film's tone were added, seemingly forced by the censorship policy. The stark difference between the last two scenes hints at an alternate ending that is much darker than the final scene of both of these films. By including the hospital scene in *Stray Dog* and the walk with the young woman in *Drunken Angel*, the mood and tone of the film switch in favor of the censors who would have been screening the film for a more positive outlook. Despite these censorship changes, the level of unity and themes across the films is fascinating. It not only makes us wonder how these themes would have been changed if there was no censorship of film but also if these "slips" and references in the censorship were allowed to be shown – what was barred from the public audience and what films and stories were not released because of it.

5 ROLE OF THE DIRECTOR'S BACKGROUND

The directors' difference in background and the time that they grew up in may account for their difference in perspective presented in their films. Ozu was part of the great power generation and he served in the army. He was born, joined the film studio, and started directing all before WWII began. He was participating in Japanese society before the occupation so he could make these contrasts between life before and after the war. This background is much different from the other film directors. Kurosawa, on the other hand, got his job in the Great Depression and was never drafted into the military. Kurosawa was greatly influenced by western cinema whereas Ozu did not conform to Hollywood conventions. Kurosawa's films were also unique as he did not have the same military experience as Ozu and focused on different classes than Ozu did throughout their films. This being said, Kurosawa started directing in 1943, shortly after the war began in the pacific theatre but was at a studio before WWII broke out.

Kobayashi was part of the wartime generation. He was born during WWI and then joined a studio in 1941 at the beginning of WWII. In comparison to the other three directors, Kobayashi was almost immediately drafted after graduating from university and he was a prisoner of war in Okinawa for Occupation forces towards the end of the war. He did not begin directing films until 1952 and these experiences and sentiments of the war and the military are experienced within his film, *The Human Condition*. Lastly, Imamura is part of the post-war/occupation generation. He did not even join a studio, let alone start directing until the American occupation was already in effect. He was only a teenager when the war began and was influenced as he grew up by the occupation forces and foreign influence seen in Japan after the war. Imamura also drew inspiration from Kurosawa's films which are comparable when you look at certain elements such as rebelling against the status quo to right some injustice or the unsettling and "real" human nature conveyed in both directors' films. Each of these various backgrounds as well as the generation that they were raised impact their

perspective and how they go about conveying this in their films.

6 CONCLUSION

While Ozu, Kurosawa, Kobayashi, and Imamura each have distinctive styles and focuses within their films, they present a unified vision for Japanese society as it transitions from wartime into the postwar era. Each director conveys a sense of rapid change in the society, external pressures and foreign influence, and a daily struggle and postwar suffering, though they are each depicted a little differently in each film. They are united by these common themes that are conveyed but are divided by what the directors choose to focus on. Largely, this difference in perspective presented in their films is because of their difference in background as people and the various times that they grew up and began making films in. By examining Japanese post-WWII occupation period film, many visions for Japanese society are presented. And though many of them are unified in key themes experienced by Japanese people, each film and each director bring another aspect to the larger picture when viewing how Japan functioned and felt for most people in the postwar period. Each of these visions, when corroborating with and against other interpretations, provides a deeper and more complex understanding of Japanese society as it transitioned from wartime into the postwar era.

7 EDITOR'S NOTES

This article was peer-reviewed.

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Self-Portrait by Mya Vander Pol

The Effects of Onlooker Gender and Restrictive Emotionality on Help-Seeking Behavior

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Abstract

Endorsing traits associated with masculinity, such as restrictive emotionality (RE), may have negative implications for the health and well-being of both male and female individuals, specifically in terms of help-seeking. The current work examines whether gender of an onlooker (i.e., a coworker) impacts participants' self-reported likelihood to seek help for a physical ailment or injury in the workplace. We also investigate if RE moderated the relationship between onlooker gender and intent to seek help. We hypothesize that participants would be more likely to seek help from a female (vs. male) coworker and this anticipated effect would be exacerbated for those relatively high in endorsement of RE. Participants (n = 129) were recruited online to engage in a study where they self-reported likelihood to seek help from a male or female coworker when experiencing various injury symptoms at work and their RE. Our results provided support for only one of our primary hypotheses: as RE increased, intent to seek help decreased. Auxiliary analyses revealed female participants were significantly more likely to seek help from a female onlooker than a male onlooker, whereas male participants were equally likely to seek help from females and males. These results suggest RE may be associated with maladaptive help-seeking behavior and participant gender and onlooker gender may interact to inform help-seeking with practical implications for developing interventions to encourage help-seeking.

Keywords: gender norms, masculinity, restrictive emotionality, help-seeking, onlooker gender, workplace

1 EXAMINING WHETHER RESTRICTIVE EMOTIONALITY MODERATES THE POTENTIAL EFFECT OF ONLOOKER GENDER ON HELP-SEEKING BEHAVIOR IN THE WORKPLACE

Often, employees will hide symptoms of physical injuries or ailments to avoid embarrassment in the workplace or a loss of income from a leave of absence or unemployment[1]. However, when physical symptoms are overlooked and left untreated, they can escalate into serious, and potentially fatal, medical conditions. For example, when tissue damage or fractures are left untreated there is risk of improper healing which can result in severe pain, visible deformities, arthritis, infection, and damage to the surrounding muscles, ligaments, and nerves[1]. Delaying or foregoing needed care can even lead to loss of mobility, which puts a person at greater risk for depression and obesity, and great financial expense[2]. Postponing help-seeking may increase the use of emergency services instead of primary care, which increases healthcare costs, burdens the federal budget, and negatively affects the economy in a plethora of ways[3]. The current work aims to examine factors that might discourage help-seeking related to physical ailments and injuries. Understanding this link is important in optimizing positive health outcomes and reducing costs associated with delayed healthcare seeking.

Help-seeking behavior can be associated with aspects of a person's identity, such as gender identity. People learn gender roles such as how a man or woman "should" think, talk, and act as a part of socialization[4]. Although many socialization processes yield prosocial outcomes, some learned norms can be maladaptive. One such trait, in the context of help-seeking, is restrictive emotionality (RE), a characteristic of masculinity defined as having difficulty expressing feelings and basic emotions[5]. There is growing evidence suggesting high RE is associated with numerous problematic health outcomes for men, such as negative attitudes toward help-seeking, negative attitudes toward psychotherapy, and an overall decrease in psychological wellbeing[6;7;8]. However, it is not just men who suffer

these consequences. Women who internalize traditional masculine roles also experience greater barriers to help-seeking[9]. In addition to internalized ideologies (e.g., RE) as a barrier to care, research suggests masculinity cues in the environment may also deter people from seeking appropriate care[6]. For example, the gender of an onlooker, such as a physician or therapist, has been implicated in help-seeking tendencies[10;11;12]. The current work expands upon available understanding of barriers to help-seeking by examining the interactive influence of RE and onlooker gender on intent to seek help. To this end, we review the relevant literature on RE and intent to seek help, discuss limited research examining gender effects of provider or onlooker, and consider the ways in which these two constructs might interact to inform help-seeking.

1.1 Restrictive Emotionality and Help-Seeking

RE is one of four identified traits that contribute to the experience of gender role conflict, which is defined as "a psychological state in which gender roles have negative consequences or impact on the person or others"[7]. The effects of gender role conflict on men have been well-documented, including its correlation with negative feelings around seeking counseling or psychological help[6;7;8]. These men have more rigid social concepts of masculinity and may fear that asking for help means losing control, displaying vulnerability, and being perceived as feminine[7]. A meta-analysis found that the most prominent barriers to help-seeking among men were poor communication, fear, embarrassment, and unwillingness to express emotions or health concerns[8]. These traditionally masculine behaviors are all correlates of RE and may predict when or if a person seeks help[6]. Much of the established literature highlighting the negative implications of gender role conflict and RE focus on men. There has been little attention paid to women, despite theorizing these negative consequences are not limited to men. For example, empirical work by Himmelstein and Sanchez found that regardless of gender, higher endorsement of masculine ideals were correlated with negative health-seeking behaviors[9]. Therefore, we predict, a main effect of RE in this study. Specifically, participants that endorse relatively greater RE will be less likely to report help-seeking intent, regardless of their gender identity.

1.2 Onlooker Gender and Help-Seeking

In addition to internalized norm barriers such as RE, context cues in the environment may also make it more difficult for individuals to seek help. Specifically, previous research suggests the gender of onlookers or healthcare providers may serve as one such cue[10;11;12]. Previous research has suggested that both men and women may display preferences regarding provider sex or gender; however, the nature of these preferences are inconsistent. A study by Black and Gringart (2019) revealed nearly half of participants had a preference for the sex of a therapist, males preferring female therapists and females preferring male therapists[10]. Participants also reported they would be significantly less likely to seek help if the therapist of their preferred sex was unavailable[10]. An earlier study however, reported that there was a unilateral preference across men and women for female therapists[12]. This finding may be attributed to gender stereotypes in personality and trait dimensions. For instance, assertiveness is associated more with male therapists, whereas nurturing behavior is attributed more to female therapists[13]. The contradicting nature of these two studies reveals a gap in the literature for the current work to fill. It will help bring consistency and results that may help us understand the importance of onlooker gender to help-seekers. While there is a plethora of existing studies about psychological help-seeking, there are a few that investigate help-seeking for physical care. One such study found both female and male patients preferred a physician of their same gender, perhaps because patients feel more comfortable with members of their own gender in a physical healthcare context[10]. This could also be a product of ingroup bias, in which help received from a member of an ingroup, such as someone of the same gender, is more welcome and comforting than from an outgroup source[14]. While there may not be a consensus on the specific pattern of gender or sex preferences in care providers, these studies suggest that gender may influence help-seeking behavior. The current work leverages this existing work but departs from gender of a care-provider to consider gender of an onlooker in the form of a coworker. Specifically, in the current work, we predict that participants will be more likely to seek help from female onlookers than male onlookers. This prediction is based on the literature above as well as a rich literature documenting consistent gender stereotypes in care-taking capacity[10;11;12;13;15;16]. One study found that females are seen as more approachable than males[15], while another found that people associated the traits of sympathy and sensitivity with females more so than males[16]. Additionally, when interacting with outgroup members, approaching females is easier than males because it is seen as an opportunity for positive social interaction[15]. Therefore, evidence suggests people might prefer to seek help from a female onlooker than a male onlooker.

1.3 Restrictive Emotionality and Onlooker Gender

The predicted effect of onlooker gender on help-seeking behavior might be moderated by endorsement of masculine norms, such as RE. Individuals with higher RE

may reject actions that others could perceive as vulnerability, like asking for help from an onlooker to whom they feel the need demonstrate their masculinity[17]. A previous study found that males working with a male supervisor in the workplace reported poorer perceptions of the supervisory working alliance than other gendered didactics, regardless of their RE levels[18]. This suggests certain aspects of socialized masculinity, like competition between men and invulnerability, may make help-seeking from a male onlooker particularly difficult for those relatively high in RE or other masculine norms endorsement[18]. Additionally, asking male onlookers for help may threaten a person's self-perceived masculinity and promote feelings of shame or inadequacy that discourage them from disclosing issues[19]. These studies suggest that male onlookers can create problematic interactions which may lead to decreased help-seeking, especially in the workplace where a person might want to assert dominance and competency. Therefore, we predict an interaction effect between RE and onlooker gender in which those who endorse higher RE will be less likely to seek help in general, but especially in the presence of a male onlooker rather than a female onlooker.

1.4 Current Work

It is widely accepted that people are more likely to disclose personal problems to their close friends and family more frequently than people they do not know very well[19]. People spend roughly 30% of their lives in the workplace, where acute injuries are not uncommon, on average totaling seven million a year[20;21]. Thus, understanding help-seeking in this domain is valuable. No studies to our knowledge focus on help-seeking for physical ailments or injuries in the workplace, making the current work novel and practically impactful. Previous studies measure intent to seek help from a professional while manipulating gender of the provider[6;8;12]. However, to our knowledge, no work has explored help-seeking from an onlooker, co-worker, or colleague, which is the focus of the current work. Existing literature examining help-seeking in psychological care settings is more prominent than in physical care settings[10;12]. This leaves a gap in the field for investigating help-seeking for acute physical ailments or injuries, rather than psychological issues. Lastly, while most studies in the field focus only on men, the current study will not restrict participation based on gender identity. Because previous work suggests socialized male role norms may similarly influence men and women, the current work does not restrict participation by gender identity[9]. The current work seeks to identify barriers to help-seeking for physical ailments and injuries. Identifying variables preventing or promoting help-seeking behavior for injuries may help inform interventions to encourage people to seek care. Promoting help-seeking has direct implications for improving an individual's health and well-being. When symptoms are left untreated, they may escalate into more serious and even life-threatening conditions causing unnecessary suffering 2. Improved help-seeking behaviors may directly increase use of primary care, appropriate treatment, and reduce reliance on emergency services[6]. This, in turn, can reduce national healthcare costs and individual-level financial burden[1]. Research for increasing help-seeking has direct implications for optimizing positive healthcare and economic outcomes.

1.4.1 Hypothesis

Based on the background literature, we have three main hypotheses. First, we predict a main effect of onlooker gender is increased likelihood of participants to seek help from a female coworker rather than a male coworker. Our second prediction is that participants with relatively greater RE will report less help-seeking intent. Lastly, we predict an interaction between onlooker gender and RE. Specifically, we predict the hypothesized effect of onlooker gender will be particularly pronounced for participants relatively high in RE as opposed to those low in RE, as high RE is often correlated with negative help-seeking attitudes[6;7;8].

2 METHODS

2.1 Participants and Power

Participants (n = 129) were recruited from MTurk Research recruitment platform, in exchange for $1.00 compensation. Participants in this study ranged in age from 19 to 71 years ($M = 40.46, SD = 12.67$). Our sample was 54.3% male, 44.2% female with one agender participant, and one participant preferring not to answer. The majority of the sample, 81.4%, were White, 9.3% were Black or African American, 7.0% were East Asian, 0.8% were South Asian, 0.8% were bi- or multi-racial, 0.8% were American Indian/Alaska Native, and 0.5% were another racial identity. Most participants, 91.5%, were not Hispanic/Latinx while only 8.5% were Hispanic/Latinx. In our sample, 83.7% of participants currently had health insurance while 16.3% did not, and one participant clarified that they are "In the process of renewal." Participants in our sample reported their frequency of doctor visits in the last two years and responses ranged from 0 to 24 visits ($M = 3.24, SD = 3.95$, *range* = 0 - 24) A sensitivity power analysis conducted in G*Power[22] ($1 - \beta = 0.95$; $\alpha = 0.05$; ANOVA with repeated measures and between subject factor measures) indicated with a sample of 129 participants we could detect an effect size of $\eta p^2 = 0.054$ or greater.

2.2 Materials

2.2.1 Vignettes

Participants were presented with symptom vignettes, each of which depicted a cluster of symptoms associated with eight different common diagnoses for emergency room visits: appendicitis, acute pancreatitis, sprained ankle, fractured wrist, migraine, kidney stone, herniated disc in back, and strained muscle in back[23]. These symptom vignettes were presented with a silhouette image of an imagined coworker (also referred to as onlooker), along with one of the top eight most common male and female names in the United States over the last 100 years[24]. For each symptom vignette, participants were asked to imagine experiencing those symptoms and indicate how likely they were to seek their help from the hypothetical coworker. For example, one symptom vignette presented participants with the scenario, "[i]magine you are experiencing the following set of symptoms: Pain, especially when you bear weight on your right foot, swelling in right ankle, bruising of right ankle, instability in the right ankle, popping sensation or sound at the time of the injury to the right ankle. Your coworker, Michael (he/his), is present and available. How likely would you be to seek help from your coworker, Michael?" Co-worker gender assigned to specific injuries or medical conditions was counterbalanced between subjects.

2.2.2 Intent to Seek Help

We adapted our Intent to Seek Help scale from the Action/Intention Help-Seeking Scale[25]. This scale was a five-item questionnaire assessing people's intent to seek help from a coworker. Participants rated how likely they were to take the following actions: "I would willingly talk about my pain with my coworker," "I would tell my coworker about my symptoms," "I would ask my coworker advice on next steps to addressing my symptoms," and "I would ask my coworker to take me to: the hospital, urgent care, or the emergency room" on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = *Highly Unlikely*, 7 = *Highly Likely*). One item, "I would not involve my coworker" was reverse scored before averaging participant responses into a composite "intent to seek help" score ($M = 3.96, SD = 1.28$). A Cronbach's alpha analysis indicated strong internal reliability (α = .94).

2.2.3 Adapted Male Role Norms Inventory – Restrictive Emotionality

A three-item questionnaire assessed participants restrictive emotionality[17]. Participants reported to what extent they agreed with the following statements about themselves: "I should never admit when others hurt my feelings," "I should be detached in emotionally charged situations," and "I should not be too quick to tell others that I care about them" on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = *Strongly Disagree*, 7 = *Strongly Agree*). No items were reverse scored before averaging participant responses into a composite "restrictive emotionality" score ($M = 4.13, SD = 2.31$). A Cronbach's alpha analysis indicated adequate internal reliability (α = .74).

2.3 Procedure

To test these hypotheses, participants took part in an online survey. After completing informed consent, participants were given eight different scenarios in which they imagined experiencing a set of symptoms (associated with common emergency room visit diagnoses; see above), in the presence of a coworker. In each vignette, coworker gender (common male or female name) was randomly determined. Coworker gender was counterbalanced so that each symptom set was randomly paired with either a male or female coworker name and silhouette. Participants saw both male and female vignettes. After viewing a given vignette, participants indicated their likelihood to seek help from a coworker if they were experiencing the listed symptoms at work. Then, participants completed the restrictive emotionality subscale of the Male Role Norms Inventory (MRNI-SF). Finally, participants answered demographic questions (reporting on age, gender identity, sexual orientation, ethnicity, race, political affiliation, frequency of doctor visits and income), were debriefed, and compensated. This design enabled investigation of RE and onlooker gender as barriers to self-reported help-seeking, as well as their interactive effect on help-seeking intentions.

3 RESULTS

3.1 Primary Analysis

To examine the effects of onlooker gender, RE, and their interaction on intent to seek help, we conducted a Modified GLM on intent to seek help with coworker gender as a repeated factor and restrictive emotionality included as a continuous moderator. This analysis yielded a non-significant main effect of coworker gender, $F(1, 126) = 0.36, p = .548, \eta p^2 = .00$, and a non-significant interaction between coworker gender and restrictive emotionality, $F(1, 126) = 0.05, p = .831, \eta p^2 = .00$. There was, however, a significant main effect of restrictive emotionality, $F(1, 126) = 4.49, p = .036, \eta p^2 = .034$. Specifically, as restrictive emotionality increased, intent to seek help decreased. Auxiliary analyses examined whether participant gender moderated any of the effects examined above. There was no evidence of moderation by participant gender ($p = 0.43, \eta p^2 = .005$).

3.2 Auxillary Analysis

We next conducted a 2x2 (participant gender x coworker gender) mixed model factorial ANOVA on intent to seek help with coworker gender as the repeated factor to explore the effects of participant gender and coworker gender on intent to seek help.The analysis yielded non-significant main effects of both participant gender, $F(1,24) = 3.29, p = .072.\eta p^2 = .026$, and coworker gender $F(1,124) = 3.06, p = .083, \eta p^2 = .024$, on intent to seek help. However, there was a significant interaction between participant gender and coworker gender on intent to seek help, $F(1,124) = 4.00, p = .047, \eta p^2 = .031$ (Figure 1). Simple effects analyses were conducted to better understand the nature of this interaction. Female participants were significantly less likely to seek help from a male coworker ($M = 4.04, SD = 0.17$) compared to a female coworker ($M = 4.37, SD = 0.18, p = .013$). Male participants were not significantly more or less likely to seek help from either a male ($M = 3.81, SD = .16$) or a female ($M = 3.79, SD = .17$) coworker, $p = .851$.

4 DISCUSSION

In this study, we hypothesized that participants would be more likely to seek help from a female coworker than a male coworker, that those with higher restrictive emotionality (RE) would be less likely to seek help, and that coworker gender and RE would interact to inform help-seeking intent. Our results provided support for only one of our hypotheses: as RE increased, intent to seek help decreased. Additional auxiliary analyses revealed an interaction between onlooker gender and participant gender; specifically, female participants were significantly more likely to seek help from a female onlooker than they were to seek help from a male onlooker. However, for male participants, onlooker gender did not influence intent to seek help.

4.1 Implications

This study suggests that endorsement of the male norm, RE, is associated with lower help-seeking intentions. This finding has implications for creating effective interventions. Interventions may target individuals relatively greater in RE and attempt to encourage comfort in help-seeking. Seeking help from others in the face of personal issues is an important skill for constructive growth[26;27]. Therefore, it is important to understand the mechanisms and predictors of help-seeking. This work offers future insights toward promoting positive health behaviors thoughtfully and strategically. Ultimately, interventions for increased help-seeking can directly improve healthcare quality and reduce costs[6].

The finding that female participants are more likely to seek help from female (relative to male) coworkers, suggest negative implications of limited workplace diversity for women's help-seeking intent. This finding could be leveraged to inform or justify gender diversity policies. Female individuals may require adequate representation, so they can feel comfortable seeking help. Our research suggests that coworker gender does not significantly impact male individuals, thus we foresee no negative consequences for men if gender diversity is made a priority in the workplace.

Our results indicate that participant gender did not moderate the association between RE and intent to seek help, which has implications that women, as well as men, endorse masculine role norms and therefore experience the consequences of them. This means that both males and females need to be considered when developing help-seeking interventions. This is consistent with the work of Himmelstein and Sanchez who suggested that regardless of gender, endorsement of masculine norms is correlated with decreased help-seeking behavior[9]. Previous literature exploring masculine norms is centered around men, which excludes a sizable subset of the population that may similarly endure negative consequences of internalization of masculine norms.

4.2 Limitations

One limitation of our study is that it was administered online in a survey format and therefore relied on participants to self-report their behavior in a hypothetical situation. The vignettes and self-report response formats may not reflect mundane realism and accurately portray how a person would act when experiencing an acute injury or health concern. To elicit more accurate results, perhaps a future study could employ a more realistic design, such as having participants play a computer game in which they are virtually injured and then monitoring their help-seeking behavior.

Another limitation was that our gender manipulation may have been too subtle to elicit an effect. In this study we did not find a significant main effect of coworker gender, this could be due, in part, to the strength of the manipulation. Participants saw vignettes that were paired with a male or female silhouette, the coworker's name, and their pronouns. These stimuli may not have been salient enough to influence a person's help-seeking behavior. It is possible that they fixated more on other factors, such as the proposed symptoms, than on gender. Future studies may need to utilize stronger manipulation. A possible solution could be to conduct the study in person or include more information about the proposed coworker in the vignette to increase the focus on them and their gender.

Another limitation of our study is that we only included male and female onlookers. This excludes a large population of individuals who lack representation in



Figure 1. ***Coworker gender (common male or female name) by participant gender (male or female) interaction on intent to seek help.*** Male participants showed no significant preference of coworker gender and intent to seek help, whereas female participants preferred female coworkers over male coworkers on intent to seek help. Error bars indicate ± 1 standard error.

the scientific world, as the number of transgender and nonbinary individuals in the U.S has doubled in the last 10 years[28]. Further research should promote more inclusive science by recruiting more diverse samples and examining help-seeking behavior and restrictive emotionality among individuals who do not identify as simply male or female (transgender, agender, genderfluid etc.).

4.3 Future Directions

Because the current work suggests high RE endorsement is related to lower help-seeking, future work should investigate what can prime this endorsement of male norms and impact help-seeking behavior. A future direction of this research would be to manipulate the masculinity of target faces and investigate participants RE endorsement and likelihood to seek help. Studies have found that certain facial features are typically perceived as masculine, such as wide faces, sharp jaws, a wide nose, thin lips, and a large lower face[29]. We predict that participants will be less willing to seek help from targets who have more facial features traditionally thought of as masculine. This is because being in the presence of a male may pose a threat to a participant's own masculinity and activate problematic outcomes[7]. Therefore, perceiving someone as more masculine may activate stronger endorsement of male norms, and therefore discourage help-seeking behaviors more so than in the presence of someone perceived to be feminine. Additionally, seeing an actual target rather than just a silhouette may address and improve upon the strength of manipulation issues found in the current work. In our study, coworker gender was not a significant determinant of help-seeking behavior, so future work should investigate other factors that could predict help-seeking. For example, future work could examine how help-seeking behavior changes when the number of onlookers is manipulated. We predict that participants would be more likely to seek help when there are fewer onlookers around. Studies have shown that individuals are more likely to conform in larger groups than smaller ones[30] and seeking out help in a large group can highlight nonconformity to masculine norms such as being tough or independent in a way that is less obvious with fewer onlookers. It may be easier for someone to go against the group and be the only person to ask for help when they are in a one-on-one situation than a minority in a large group. Another future direction could be to examine the role of onlooker characteristics (e.g., age, race, etc.). In the current study, these traits are not included in the description of the onlooker, so a future investigation could observe how a person's willingness to seek help from an onlooker changed when other characteristics are manipulated. We predict that participants would be more likely to seek help from those similar to themselves rather than someone who significantly differs from them. This is

because of ingroup bias, which states that getting help from an ingroup source is more comfortable and accepted than from an outgroup source[31]. Someone in your ingroup is someone with whom you share a common identity or interest, such as someone of your same age or generation[31]. Therefore, a participant may feel more comfortable asking someone closer in age for help because they identify with and relate to them more.

5 CONCLUSION

The results of this study indicate important findings for the field of help-seeking. Specifically, that high RE is associated with lesser help-seeking intentions for both males and females and needs to be addressed in interventions. Additionally, female participants were more likely to seek help from a female than a male coworker, whereas male participants were equally likely to seek help from a male or female. Thus, highlighting the importance for female representation in the workplace so that females can feel comfortable seeking necessary help. Understanding individual-level and environmental characteristics that may impede help-seeking and promotes development of theory-driven intervention strategies targeting those most vulnerable. Avoiding medical care may result in later detection of disease, lower likelihood of survival, and potentially preventable costs and suffering[27;32]. These risks can be mitigated by encouraging appropriate help-seeking behavior for physical ailments and injuries.

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7 EDITOR'S NOTES

This article was peer-reviewed.

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Devour by Merit Willey

Investigating the Effects of Climate Change on the Phenology of *Achillea millefolium, Aquilegia coerulea,* and *Penstemon cyanocaulis*

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Abstract

As the effects of climate change are starting to unearth themselves, the impacts can be observed by tracking the patterns of cyclical natural phenomena also known as phenology, and monitoring how they have changed over time. These cycles are at the crux of making ecosystems viable for their local biodiversity, and understanding the ongoing change allows for further understanding of the ecosystem's change over time. In this study, we look at the ordinal flowering dates of the *Achillea millefolium*, *Aquilegia coerulea*, and *Penstemon cyanocaulis* over the past century. Our data give insight into how warmer temperatures occurring earlier in the year are changing the cycle of flowering plants in the western United States. This framework encourages more investigation into the changes in plant phenology throughout different regions due to climate change.

Keywords: climate change, phenology, conservation, ecology, *Achillea millefolium*, *Aquilegia coerulea*, *Penstemon cyanocaulis*

1 INTRODUCTION

Phenology is the study of cyclical natural phenomena. Scientists use it to examine how plant and animal life, as well as various natural occurrences, vary with seasonal and climatic changes. Studying phenology allows us to observe how certain cycles change over time with relation to environmental factors, such as climate. From 1907 to 2007, the World Meteorological Organization recorded a 0.74°C increase in average global temperature. It has been shown that warming temperatures in Colorado have caused earlier flowering times in several rare plant species[1] and that several alpine species in Colorado are blooming earlier[2]. However, to our knowledge, individual, common plant species at lower elevations across Colorado have yet to be investigated. In this research, we examine the bloom times of three common flowering plants in Colorado to see if warming temperatures have an impact on when these species bloom.

We begin by looking at the bloom times of *Achillea millefolium*. This species is found in many regions throughout North America, Europe, and Oceania, and typically blooms during the summer months[3]. A study examining the flowering time of *A. millefolium* in the alpine region of Europe concluded that a lowland environment was better for the reproduction of this plant species. Given that temperatures are generally higher at lower elevations, this corresponds with the preferred warmer temperatures for *A. millefolium* taxon to bloom[4].

There is little published information on *A. millefolium*'s response to climate change; however, one study done by Sebastià et al. in the subalpine grasslands of the Pyrenees Mountain range in Europe found that the biomass of *A. millefolium* increased significantly after a short period of warming and drought, suggesting that this species thrives in warmer temperatures[5]. Another study performed in the Snowy Mountains range of Australia, by Johnston and Pickering, revealed that altitude impacted the flowering times of *A. millefolium*, with shorter flowering periods earlier in the year at higher altitudes[6]. This suggests that this species has decreased fitness, or less successful reproduction, in cooler temperatures; both features of high altitudes.

We also examine how warming temperatures in the state of Colorado may impact the flowering time of the Colorado blue columbine, *Aquilegia coerulea*. When studying the phenology of *A. coerulea*, it is important to note the variation in the ecosystems in which the



Figure 1. *A. millefolium* ordinal flowering date in Colorado between 1907 and 2012.

species occurs naturally. In a recent study, the change in flowering time for various species was found to be dependent on both temperature and altitude, with high elevation individuals showing no significant shift of flowering time in response to the changing climate[7]. It is possible the flowering times for the Colorado blue columbine may vary significantly throughout various regions at different altitudes, making it more difficult to detect the impact of warming temperatures.

The rapid responses of flowering time to the warming temperatures are due to phenotypic plasticity, or change in an organism's phenotype in response to environmental changes[8]. While there have been studies focusing on the effects of climate change on the alpine species, *A. coerulea*'s response has not been widely studied.

Penstemon cyanocaulis continue in this trend; like many other flowering species in the same climatic region, the flower times are predicted to become earlier in the year as climate change progresses and the regional temperature and climate patterns of the Rockies grows warmer. One 2011 study analyzed *P. cyanocaulis* growing in the Rocky Mountain region of the Colorado River Basin to develop a predictive model using various climate data, including precipitation, surface air temperature, and water runoff, to determine bloom-date changes[9]. They determined that earlier snowmelt dates and higher spring temperatures led to earlier bloom dates of this species. Another study analyzed the effects of climate change on flowering phenology in Gunnison County, CO[10]. The flowering phenology of two spring seasons were analyzed in the context of the previous winter's snowmelt date. The researchers determined that yearly changes in phenology and growth of the flowers were related to soil temperatures and snowmelt date. A separate study done specifically on the genus *Penstemons*, tested the effects of January temperature fluctuations on germination timing[11]. The majority of species exhibited earlier germination when winter temperatures were higher, including *P. cyanocaulis*.

In this research, the null hypothesis (H_0) was that the bloom times (as determined by the collection date in herbarium specimens of *A. millefolium*, *A. coerulea*, and *P. cyanocaulis*), do not change over time. That is, changes in bloom time are due to chance. We predict that blooming will occur earlier in the year over time because of cues from warming temperatures.

2 METHODS

The data for all species were collected from the Rocky Mountain Herbarium Specimen Database[12]. After filtering out the data for the plants that were not flowering, leaving only the data for the flowering plants as well as the flowering and fruiting plants, the ordinal date of the blooming time was calculated to show how many days into the year each species of flower bloomed. Ordinal date considers January 1st as 1 and allows us to determine if recorded bloom times occurred earlier or later in the year over time. For all three species, there were collections that spanned more than a century and were from many locations in Colorado. With these data, we then tested our null hypothesis that bloom time, as measured by ordinal date of collection, did not change over time using a linear regression test, with ordinal date of flowering time as the dependent variable and



Figure 2. *A. coerulea* ordinal flowering date in Colorado between 1892 and 2014.

year as the independent variable.

3 RESULTS

3.1 *Achillea millefolium*

Figure 1 shows the relationship between collection date (ordinal date) and collection year (n = 344). The regression, $y = 0.4395x + 1085.8$, is statistically significant. Since the p-value (p = 0.003) is less than 0.05, we rejected the null hypothesis. Using the equation of the regression line, we calculated that the ordinal date in 2021 would likely be approximately 198, which is 61 days earlier than the first recorded bloom time in 1907. R^2 = 0.03.

3.2 *Aquilegia coerulea*

Figure 2 depicts ordinal date and year for *A. coerulea* (n = 458). The p-value of p = 0.42 and R^2 = 0.001 shows that the relationship between ordinal date and year is not statistically significant. Thus, we do not reject the null hypothesis of no change in ordinal date over time.

3.3 *Penstemon cyanocaulis*

The total number of data points and specimens cataloged for *P. cyanocaulis* was n = 46 (Figure 3). The relationship between year and ordinal date was statistically significant with $p < 0.003$ and R^2 = 0.19. Using the equation of the regression line ($y = -0.194x + 532.91$), we calculated that the ordinal date in 2021 would likely be approximately 142, which is 32 days earlier than the first recorded bloom time in 1912.

4 DISCUSSION

Overall, our results partially support the hypothesis that blooming of common Colorado wildflowers is occurring earlier over time. Two of the three species had significantly negative slopes of collection date across years, using data that spanned over a century.

The results show that there is a relationship between bloom time of *A. millefolium* and year recorded, supporting previous findings that there is a relationship between warming temperatures and bloom time of this plant taxon. However, the R^2 value was low, indicating that a very small proportion of the variance for the measurements of the dependent variable (ordinal date of bloom time) can be explained by the relationship be-



Figure 3. *P. cyanocaulis* ordinal flowering date in Colorado between 1914 and 2012.

tween ordinal date and the year recorded. This shows a limitation to this approach in using the ordinal date of the bloom time to infer a relationship between warming temperatures and bloom time of this species. First, collection date is an imperfect measure of flowering time, since we do not know when during the window of time it was flowering the collection took place. Second, *A. millefolium* can grow at many different elevations and across the state; thus, even if temperature perfectly predicts bloom time, we would expect there to be variability caused by location. Third, there is a large gap in the data for this species, during which time the bloom dates of the flowers could have shown a different pattern throughout; this lack of data limits the confidence with which it can be interpreted.

Finally, there could be other, unknown variables at play. For instance, *A. millefolium* could flower based on environmental or genetic markers other than temperature; this marker that varied in the same manner as temperature over the recorded time shown, indicating that there could be confounding variables in this study that impact its validity. If this is the case, we are concluding that warming temperatures cause premature blooming in this species, when in fact, it is another environmental factor that causes the premature blooming. There may even be a blooming trigger that is completely unrelated or less directly related to the climate, such as the presence or absence of a certain insect species. If any of these are the reason for the pattern we observed, then we would be making a Type I error in concluding a relationship between the bloom time of *A. millefolium* and climate change.

On the other hand, if precipitation or some atmospheric condition impacts bloom time of *A. millefolium*, then we can likely link climate change to the cause of earlier blooming, as climatic change also impacts precipitation and other atmospheric conditions.

While a Type I error is technically possible, it is unlikely as previous research discussed in the introduction shows a relationship between the bloom time of *A. millefolium* and climate. Human-caused climate change is likely the cause of premature blooming of this species, with variability caused by direct (precipitation, temperature) and indirect (soil health, presence or absence of insect species) effects.

As for *A. coerulea*, there is failure to reject the null hypothesis. Thus, the year the data were collected has no relationship to the date of collection for *A. coerulea* in the state of Colorado. This suggests that there is no significant change in the flowering time of the *A. coerulea* in response to warmer temperatures due to climate change. This may be because not all species use temperature as a cue to begin flowering, but may use photoperiod, which is the amount of illumination an organism receives in a day. Of course, day length does not change from year to year, so if this is the cue for flowering, there would be no change in collection date over time.

Alternatively, it is possible that *A. corulea* is affected by temperature but we failed to detect it; that is, our analysis yielded a Type II error. This may be due to the high variability seen in Figure 2, likely caused by the fact that these specimens were collected from many dif-

ferent populations over a wide geographic area. Ideally, the observed species would be in one concentrated area. Using observations on individual populations over time may have provided a better indicator for the possible effect of temperature on the species' flowering date. This would minimize the variation seen in this data set and would improve the understanding on the changing climate's effects on Colorado's state flower.

Regarding *P. cyanocaulis*, the significant linear regression with a negative slope indicates that over the 100 years of data, the ordinal date of blooming for this species has continued to shift earlier in the year. The overall trend exhibited by the significant slope gives strong evidence that there have indeed been changes to the phenology of *P. cyanocaulis*, despite the mild fluctuations in bloom date from year to year. Additionally, there is a period in the data in which there is an absence of *P. cyanocaulis* samples collected. This gap in the data means that there is uncertainty as to what occurred during this period in history. However, the distribution of the data was different enough, showing that climate change is changing the flowering dates of *P. cyanocaulis*. Based on these results of a pattern that has occurred over the last 100 years, and that the globe is still warming due to climate change, we predict that the flowering date will likely continue to shift to earlier in the year.

While all three of these species of flowering plants can be found in Colorado and the Western states, their response to the warming climate differs among them. These differences may be attributed to additional influences on blooming time, such as day length, soil or precipitation conditions, etc. It will require further research to determine the specific triggers for bloom date for each species.

This method of studying the relationship between plant phenology and climate change is becoming more common as herbarium data is now easier to access through public databases. However, there are still some issues to consider with this method. First, it is entirely dependent on what data happened to be collected on a particular species over time. There is also no guarantee that there is sufficient data for a particular species, as the species could span a more extensive range than surveyed. Additionally, although we found a significant change in flowering date over time for two species, and over this same period temperatures have been warming, this does not prove causality. However, given that many species are cued by temperatures, it seems likely that these species are responding to climate change.

Premature blooming as the result of warming temperatures can impact the entire ecosystem. For instance, various insects may miss out on pollination if they have a different cue than temperature. This affects not only the population of those insects but the flowering plants as well, as fertilization and seed dispersal will not be possible without the presence of pollinators. Further research on the factors that impact flowering times can help inform conservation decision-making and how best to preserve important species and ecosystems.

5 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

We would like to acknowledge Dr. Anna Sher for her amazing work in Conservation Biology and as a professor. Her skills and effort made the class an incredible learning opportunity and a chance for us to be involved in relevant, necessary research. We would also like to thank our Teaching Assistant, Alex Goetz, for all his help in allowing this research to go smoothly.

6 EDITOR'S NOTES

This article was peer-reviewed.

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No Charge by Merit Willey

Color Me by Christine Stadnik-Poteroba

DU Research Grants Fuel Undergraduate Student Creativity and Academic Projects

Anit Tyagi[1], on behalf of the Editorial Board
[1]DUURJ Editor at Large, University of Denver

1 OVERVIEW

The University of Denver has several funding options for undergraduate students seeking to carry out research under the tutelage of experienced faculty members, present their findings on a national or international stage, and implement scholarly community outreach initiatives. These funding options have helped defray the costs associated with conducting and presenting research for thousands of students and faculty and are an important facet of the research experience at DU. Here the Editorial Board explores the various funding options undergraduate students have access to throughout their research experience(s) at DU.

2 PARTNERS IN SCHOLARSHIP (PINS) GRANTS

Undergraduate students looking to collaborate on a research project with a faculty member should consider applying for a Partners in Scholarship (PinS) grant which provides up to $1,500 in funding. PinS grants from the Undergraduate Research Center (URC) may be used for supplies, equipment, and research-related travel; however, PinS grants cannot be used to fund tuition, internships, service learning, classes, or lessons. Before applying for this unique opportunity, students should work with their faculty partners to develop a detailed project proposal. In addition, while most partnerships involve one-on-one work with a faculty member, students are permitted to work with multiple faculty members or with other students. All projects must be finished by June 1st of the academic year and students funded by this grant are required to present their findings at the annual DU Research and Scholarship Showcase held in Spring Quarter. PinS grant applications and project proposal deadlines occur once every quarter. URC faculty grant reviewers look favorably upon well-written, thorough project proposals that can be understood by a general audience.

3 STUDENT SCHOLAR TRAVEL FUND (SSTF)

Undergraduates who have a paper, poster, or other creative scholarly work that has been accepted for professional presentation at an academic conference or meeting are able to apply for the Student Scholar Travel Fund (SSTF) to help lessen the costs (up to $1,000) associated with travel and attending the event. In order to be considered for this type of funding, travel should be for the purpose of presenting academic research and the travel must be completed before graduation. SSTF applications are accepted and reviewed on a rolling basis throughout the academic year and undergrads may only receive one travel grant per academic year. Students may apply at any time for this grant, including at the time they submit their work to the conference or meeting. In such cases, funds will be available upon confirmation of acceptance. Undergraduates funded by this grant are required to present their research at the annual DU Research and Scholarship Showcase held in Spring Quarter. Students applying need to provide details on the academic conference or meeting they plan on attending, along with an itemized budget and a title and summary of their presentation.

4 SUMMER RESEARCH GRANTS

Summer Research Grants, like PinS grants, are intended to promote student and faculty collaborative research projects. Undergraduate students, who are not graduating seniors, may request up to $3,500 to help fund a project that lasts between one and ten weeks and may include a payable stipend award in addition to project expenditures. Additionally, while most partnerships involve one-on-one work with a faculty member, students are permitted to work with multiple faculty members or with other students. If working with other students, each student must submit an application stating their personal contribution to the project and is eligible to receive up to $3,500. All award funding must be used by September 1st of the upcoming academic year. Funding from the URC may be used for supplies, equipment, and research-related travel; however, the

Figure 1. University of Denver undergraduate students outside the Ritchie School of Engineering and Computer Science collecting data for a research project

Summer Research Grant cannot fund service-learning programs, tuition, DU courses, or lessons. Summer Research Grant awardees are required to attend the annual DU Research and Scholarship Showcase held in Spring Quarter to learn more about the summer research experience and the expectations and opportunities that come with it. Following their summer research experience, awardees will then have to present their research findings at the next Showcase.

For the 2019-2020 academic year, the URC gave out 23 PinS awards, 50 Summer Research Grants, and 16 SSTF awards, for a total of 89 funding awards. Grace Warner, Program Coordinator of the URC, mentioned, "Funding for academic year PinS awards is typically used for lab supplies and project materials. For the Summer Research Grants, the majority of the funding goes to paying students for their research. We typically give out between 85-100 awards each year." To learn more about PinS, SSTF, and Summer Research Grant funding, contact the URC at urc@du.edu.

DU research faculty have appreciated the funding support provided to their undergraduate students by the URC. Robert M. Dores, Ph.D., Professor in the Department of Biological Sciences, said, "I have had several students take advantage of the PinS program, the Summer Research Grant program and the Travel Grant program provided by the URC. My goal is to engage undergraduates in original research projects that overlap with my personal research projects and the projects of my graduate students. External funding sources cover much of the expenses associated with these projects, but not all. The funds provided by the URC has made it possible to engage undergraduates to a significant degree in my research program, and since these programs were started 20 students have had their research published in refereed journals. More specifically, Megan Deyarmond received travel funds to attend the Endocrine Society meeting in Orlando, Florida in 2017. Megan went on to medical school at Georgetown University. Alexa Thomas received a Summer Research Grant and was able to complete two peer-reviewed articles before graduation, and she is completing her medical training at the Mayo Clinic."

Daniel Linseman, Ph.D., Professor in the Department of Biological Sciences and Faculty Director of the URC stated, "I am a professor in the Department of Biological Sciences, and I have been a faculty member at DU for 15 years. Since joining DU in 2006, I have supervised 60+ undergraduate research projects (PinS and Summer Research Grants) and have mentored 25 undergraduate students to completion of their thesis for distinction or honors. Given my past experience, I can say without hesitation that mentoring undergraduate students in research has been a highlight of my academic career. I strongly encourage students to participate in the many opportunities discussed in this issue of the DUURJ. The URC is proud to sponsor the PinS and Summer Research Grant programs that fund research projects based on student/faculty partnerships throughout the academic year and summer, respectively. In addition, we also sponsor the Student Scholar Travel Fund (SSTF) to assist students who wish to present their scholarly and creative work at conferences and meetings. If you have questions regarding how to get involved in any of our programs, please check us out online at https://www.du.edu/urc/about-us.html or email us at urc@du.edu."

5 SPECIAL HONORS FUNDING

Undergraduate students who are part of the DU Honors Program and are engaged in research for their thesis

Figure 2. University of Denver Anderson Academic Commons, home of the University Writing Center

or other approved academic project are eligible to apply for Special Honors Funding. This grant provides up to $1,000 in supplemental funding to help support the student's academic work by subsidizing the costs of scholarly pursuits including the purchase of research materials and travel to conferences and meetings. Students applying must provide an itemized budget and a detailed description of their research project and its role in their academic requirements and plans. Funding applications are accepted on a rolling basis. To learn more, contact the Honors Program at honors@du.edu.

Katherine Tennis, Ph.D., Director of the Center for Undergraduate Scholarship and Honors and Faculty Director of the Honors Program, mentioned, "Special Honors Funding is a great perk of being an active member of the Honors program. It can be used for costs associated with completing your distinction research project – including things like travel, access to data or archives, materials access, or other research expenses. The funding is competitive and is not guaranteed, but we try to provide resources based on need and merit to as many Honors students as possible."

6 ADVANCING COMMUNITY ENGAGED (ACE) STUDENT SCHOLARS GRANTS

As part of DU Grand Challenges (DUGC) initiative, undergraduate students are able to submit project proposals for community-engaged research or creative work that is designed to improve daily living, create economic opportunities in our local or global communities, and/or facilitate deliberation and action for the public good. Projects focused on improving daily living might work on food and housing insecurity, crime and safety, migration, and/or urban sustainability. In addition, projects focused on increasing economic opportunities might work on education access, improving transportation options, decreasing poverty, advancing entrepreneurship, and/or employment rights and workplace equity. Finally, students focused on facilitating deliberation and action for the public good might work on projects that inspire civic engagement, amplify youth voices, prepare new leaders, and/or strengthen our connections to one another.

Several undergraduate research projects have recently been funded through these grants. For example, two International Studies undergraduate students, under the supervision of Bob Uttaro, Ph.D., partnered with Kwale County, Kenya to study best practices in local conservation given that local communities are often excluded in larger conservation efforts leading to lower indigenous knowledge of conservation. The project is a case study undertaken with Kwale County, Kenya where collaborative conservation efforts have been largely successful. Their study aims to determine which sources of knowledge will best inform the efforts in this community to make them successful in achieving their conservation goals. They claim that understanding the sources of knowledge that best inform the successful conservation efforts of Kwale County will contribute to the creation of a more effective and robust conservation model for efforts throughout Kenya.

Another ACE student scholars grant example includes a Psychology undergraduate student, under the supervision of Barbekka Hurtt, Ph.D. in the Biological Sciences Department, who partnered with the Denver Rescue Mission to pilot and evaluate a comprehensive nutrition education program at the Crossing Center, a transitional housing program for men experiencing homelessness in Denver. In their research program, participants completed pre/post tests to measure changes in nutrition knowledge and confidence in cooking healthy meals. Their results will be compared with an assessment (currently underway) of the Crossing's general population on these same measures.

Individual students may apply for an ACE grant, issued by the Center for Community Engagement to advance Scholarship and Learning (CCESL), that provides up to $2,000 to support a community-engaged research or creative work project that is faculty-mentored. Students interested in pursuing a project must work with a faculty mentor who is familiar with the subject

area. Interdisciplinary teams for research and creative work are highly encouraged and groups of two or more can apply for up to $5,000. Applications are accepted on a rolling basis and are reviewed once every quarter. In the 2020-2021 academic year, DUGC was able to award almost $45,000 in ACE Grant funds, a 12% increase from the previous academic year, to help support 13 faculty-mentored community-engaged research projects involving 38 undergraduate students and 19 community partners. To learn more about project ideas, faculty mentorship, or requirements, contact CCESL at CCESL@du.edu.

7 HOW STUDENTS CAN LEARN TO WRITE GRANT PROPOSALS

DU's Writing Center, located in the Anderson Academic Commons, holds regular workshops to help undergraduate students prepare their grant proposals for any of the above-mentioned funding sources. Workshops will help students develop a research question and methods, understand the feasibility and fit of the project, and write for a general, educated audience. In addition, the Writing Center assists students applying for a Student Scholar Travel Fund grant with workshops and resources on writing an abstract and creating a research poster. Students interested in receiving help in writing funding proposals, or in preparing for academic presentations, should contact the Writing Center at wrc@du.edu.

8 CONCLUSION

A central feature of the University of Denver research experience is the faculty-mentored culture of inquiry concerned with real-world issues, ideas, and questions, often providing a rich and intellectually stimulating experience for many undergraduate students. Corinne Lengsfeld, Ph.D., Senior Vice Provost for Research and Graduate Education, stated that, "Undergraduates surveyed point to study abroad and undergraduate research as the two most transformative co-curriculars in their career at DU. I strongly encourage students to explore undergraduate research as a way to apply their knowledge to impactful problems."

Undergraduate research, like most research, requires monetary support. Costs associated with supplies, student stipends, travel, and conference presentations quickly add up. Throughout this article, we have highlighted various funding sources DU undergraduates have access to as they pursue academic research and scholarly community engagement projects. We encourage students to work with their faculty mentors to take advantage of these funding resources.

A Closer Look by Haley Nelson

Dr. Jennifer Hoffman

Department of Physics & Astronomy

Anit Tyagi[1], on behalf of the Editorial Board
[1]DUURJ Editor at Large, University of Denver

Figure 1. Professor Hoffman outside Chamberlin Observatory, May 2012

1 TELL US ABOUT YOURSELF, SUCH AS WHERE YOU WENT TO SCHOOL, HOW YOU BECAME INTERESTED IN YOUR MAJOR RESEARCH AREAS, AND HOW YOU FOUND YOUR WAY TO DU

I majored in physics and astrophysics as an undergrad at UC Berkeley and got my Ph.D. in astronomy from the University of Wisconsin-Madison. All I knew when I started grad school was that I wanted to learn about stars, as opposed to planets, galaxies, cosmology, etc. The professor who became my adviser happened to have funding for a study on interacting binary stars at the time I needed a project, so that became the focus of my dissertation. In my postdoctoral work at Rice, I studied very young, just-forming stars using the same observing and modeling techniques I had developed for the binary systems. Then I got an NSF fellowship to apply the same techniques to supernova explosions, and I went back to Berkeley to work with supernova research groups on the UC campus and at the Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory. During grad school I had discovered I really enjoyed teaching, so when I started applying for faculty jobs, I was deliberately looking for a school that valued teaching and research equally highly. DU was one of the only places I applied that seemed to get that balance right, so I was delighted to take a faculty job here.

Coincidentally, I took my very first astronomy class at DU! I was in middle school, visiting Denver for a two-week summer camp; we lived in Centennial Halls, took classes in Boettcher, and visited the Chamberlin Observatory. So, when I came back here as a professor and astronomer, it was like coming full circle.

2 WHY DID YOU BECOME A SCIENTIST? WHAT DREW YOU TO THIS FIELD? WHAT MAKES YOU GET UP IN THE MORNING?

I'm here because studying astronomy makes me feel connected to the Universe. I don't think of it as an escape or a pursuit that's separate from the "real world." Just as other sciences help us understand our relationship to the Earth, astronomy shows us how both we and the Earth fit into a larger, cosmic environment. I think it's amazingly cool that just by looking out into space from our tiny planet, we can figure out what the Universe is made of, how we are related to it, what a beautiful variety of phenomena it contains, how it began and how it might end.

Figure 2. Professor Hoffman giving a tour of the Chamberlin Observatory to Chancellor Jeremy Haefner, November 2021

3 WHAT ARE YOUR TEACHING INTERESTS? WHAT IS YOUR TEACHING PHILOSOPHY?

My goal in teaching is to make science welcoming and accessible to students from all backgrounds. I'm motivated by the concept of "groundskeeping," developed by Dr. Beronda Montgomery at Michigan State University. Many of our traditional academic and scientific practices take the form of "gatekeeping," or restricting access to specialized knowledge based on biased assumptions about who is deserving and talented enough to receive it. By contrast, a groundskeeping approach asks the instructor to pay attention not only to the subject matter in a class but also to the culture of the learning community and the needs and well-being of the people within it. This is important because successful learning and scientific discovery depend not only on individual efforts but also on the academic and professional environments we navigate. In my classrooms and other communities, I'm trying to create healthy, supportive social ecosystems that allow all participants to thrive.

4 WHAT SPARKED YOUR INTEREST IN THE FIELD THAT YOU WORK IN?

Like many kids, I was super interested in space at a young age and wanted to be an astronaut, particularly after the Challenger disaster in 1986 halted the spaceflight program for a couple of years. I thought that was a shame and wanted to volunteer to go to space immediately! But during high school, I realized I was really interested in learning about stars, planets, and galaxies and that I could do that just as well, if not better, from the ground as from Earth orbit.

5 HOW HAS THE PROCESS, OR THE PROFESSION OF RESEARCH CHANGED OVER THE PAST FEW DECADES IN YOUR FIELD?

Astronomy is undergoing a really interesting transition into an era of "big data." My dissertation focused on one single object, a binary star known as beta Lyrae, but now that we have enormous multiwavelength and time-dependent all-sky surveys, the days when one scientist studies one star or star system at a time are probably over. A fun example shows up in the way we name supernovae. These stellar explosions are going on all the time in galaxies both near and far from us. But before telescopes were invented, people could only detect supernovae with the unaided eye, so they could only see nearby explosions within the Milky Way or its satellite galaxies. These were so rare that each one had its own name, like "Tycho's supernova" in 1572. In the 20th century, high-quality telescopes and digital imaging allowed us to discover more supernovae each year, so we started naming them with the year and a letter. For example, Supernova 1987A was the first one discovered in 1987. In the late '80s, when we started discovering more than 26 supernovae per year, we started over in the alphabet with "SN 1989aa, SN 1989ab," etc. This combined one- and two-letter scheme gets you up to 26 x 27, or 702 supernovae per year. But in recent years with new automated sky surveys, we've started to discover even more than that. As of November 2021, we are up to "SN 2021qqq," which is the 11,249th supernova discovered this year alone! With terabytes of data rolling in on thousands of objects, the focus is now on developing powerful methods for classifying and analyzing them in large groups, as well as detecting and interpreting patterns in these massive data sets. So computational methods are increasingly important for the future of astronomy research.

6 DESCRIBE YOUR CURRENT RESEARCH IN LAYMAN'S TERMS

We know that stars more massive than the Sun explode as supernovae when they reach a certain stage of their lives or, as astronomers say, their "evolution." But our understanding of the physics of supernova explosions relies on the assumption that the original star is a "loner," far away from other stars. It turns out that

Figure 3. A snow-covered Pine Bluff Observatory, Pine Bluff, WI, early 2000s

the majority of massive stars interact with stellar companions at some point in their lives. Their mutual gravitational forces and the actions of their strong stellar winds can pull gas off the stars, transferring it from one to the other or ejecting it away from both, and this loss of mass can be significant enough to alter the course of the stars' subsequent evolution. This is great news because companion interactions may help explain the extremely wide variety of supernovae and other related explosive stellar phenomena that we observe. But the wide variety of different effects these interactions can have on stellar evolution definitely makes the picture more complicated!

My research group studies how binary interactions may affect the evolution of massive stars and whether we can see evidence of these interactions in supernova explosions. We do this with a technique called polarimetry, which measures not just the amount of light we receive from astronomical objects but also how much, and in what direction, that light is polarized, meaning the light waves are partially aligned. This alignment happens when light bounces off free electrons in the hot, ionized material surrounding the stars or supernova. We can use the information encoded in the polarization to figure out where that ionized material is located and what its shape is. We are investigating whether the gaseous structures that form when two massive stars exchange material might leave detectable signatures after one of the stars explodes. To do this, we obtain time-dependent polarization observations of massive binary systems in our Galaxy and faraway supernovae, using big ground-based telescopes like the MMT in Arizona and the Southern African Large Telescope in South Africa. Then we use supercomputers to create simulations of both kinds of stellar systems to help us interpret the data. This process lets us build 3-dimensional reconstructions of stellar phenomena that are too far away for even the most powerful telescopes to image.

7 WHAT WOULD YOU CHANGE TO IMPROVE HOW WORK IN YOUR FIELD IS DONE? IN OTHER WORDS, WHAT LEGISLATION MIGHT YOU PASS OR WHAT POLICIES WOULD YOU CHANGE AND WHY?

This isn't legislation or policy, and it's not a magic wand for fixing all that ails us. But I wish I could convince everyone that science isn't a holy, faultless endeavor completely divorced from the rest of society. It's a pursuit developed by and practiced by people, and the people who have historically developed and practiced Western science are an extremely homogeneous group of white folks, primarily men, of European descent. So, their human flaws and biases, as well as the systematic flaws and biases of their cultural systems, are baked into the entire structure of science as we know it. It's good that many scientists are starting to acknowledge that we need to create a more diverse and inclusive scientific community, both to find better, more innovative solutions to complex problems and to create a more just,

humane, and equitable scientific culture. But if we're going to do more than pay lip service to these ideals, we have to understand that our institutions and practices are still rooted in systemic racism and colonialism. It's not a betrayal of science to recognize these facts, and it's not anti-scientific to work to change traditions that we know are biased and harmful.

8 CAN YOU SHARE A TURNING POINT OR DEFINING MOMENT IN YOUR WORK AS A SCIENTIST?

When I was in grad school, my Ph.D. adviser was an expert in stellar polarimetry, so he taught me what I know about the observational side of my work. I had a second mentor who was an expert in creating the kinds of simulations that I began to use to interpret the polarimetric data I was obtaining, and she trained me in the theoretical and computational side of the project. In my dissertation research, I combined the two techniques by creating new kinds of simulations to model polarization data in particular.

I remember that at one point, in my fourth year of grad school or so, I ran into a problem that was simultaneously too computational for my adviser to answer and too observational for my mentor to answer, so I couldn't ask either one of them for help. I experienced a moment of simultaneous excitement and terror when I realized I was the only person, maybe in the world, who could figure out the answer to this problem. Probably something like this happens to everyone who gets a Ph.D., because the point of pursuing a doctorate is to become an independent expert in your own specific research area. But I remember it as a very intense revelation that I had gotten to the point where no one else could help me do the thing I had set out to do. Although the emotional memory is vivid, I don't even remember now what the problem was, but I must have eventually figured it out!

9 WHAT DO YOU LIKE TO DO WHEN YOU AREN'T WORKING ON RESEARCH?

I manage DU's historic Chamberlin Observatory (Figure 1 and 2), in collaboration with the Denver Astronomical Society, which lets me involve the public in astronomy and encourage people to think about the night sky as part of their cultural heritage and daily life. I co-direct a summer camp called DU SciTech with Dr. Robin Tinghitella and Dr. Shannon Murphy from biology that brings middle-school girls of color to campus for hands-on science activities – we recently published a research paper with many of the camp participants from 2019! Outside my professional activities, I like to read, hike, and birdwatch. I have also sung with the Colorado Chorale for the past 10 years. Once I even helped organize an astronomy-themed concert and associated observatory night!

10 WHAT ARE YOUR VIEWS ON CURRENT PUBLIC POLICY ISSUES IN SCIENCE AND MORE SPECIFICALLY PHYSICS?

The absolute most important issue for everyone in the world right now is climate change. That doesn't mean my field is irrelevant – in fact, astronomy has an important role to play in our response to the climate crisis. Astronomy can help us contextualize the enormity and seriousness of the recent global temperature increases and understand what happens to planets under extreme climate conditions. But I think it does mean that all of us need to find ways to pressure governments, corporations, and other influential organizations to take immediate and dramatic action to slash CO_2 emissions and to protect vulnerable communities from the environmental disaster that is already in motion. We have waited far too long for gradual, painless solutions to have any impact. Now we're talking about our kids' and grandkids' future. The biggest danger right now, I think, is that as people in the biggest carbon-consuming countries realize we are too late to prevent a significant amount of damage to the climate, they may get so discouraged they feel that nothing can be done. This isn't true! The answer is not to give up hope or fantasize about escaping to some other planet. Rather, we need to find ways to rediscover a sense of responsibility, kinship, and connectedness with our environment. Collectively, we can muster the will to save what can still be saved, minimize further damage, and learn to live more respectfully on the Earth, which is home to the only sparks of life we know about in the whole Universe.

11 OTHER FUN FACTS

While I was in grad school in Wisconsin, I got to be the resident and caretaker at the Pine Bluff Observatory, a research observatory 10 miles west of campus on a rural hilltop in the little unincorporated town of Pine Bluff (Figure 3). My partner and I lived there for four years. Our nearest neighbors were dairy farmers, deer and possums and coyotes wandered through the meadow around the building, and it was blissfully quiet. We mowed the grass and shoveled the snow and set up bluebird boxes in the meadow and dealt with hordes of migrating ladybugs and went on long rambling walks over the rolling hills and got up in the middle of the night when one of the undergraduate observing team members had trouble with the telescope. We even got married on the back lawn and gave our wedding guests tours of the dome! I felt extremely grounded and connected to my surroundings there, and I'm grateful I was able to experience it.

Binary by Merit Willey

Dr. Naomi Reshotko

Department of Philosophy

Anit Tyagi[1], on behalf of the Editorial Board
[1]DUURJ Editor at Large, University of Denver

1 TELL US ABOUT YOURSELF, SUCH AS WHERE YOU WENT TO SCHOOL, HOW YOU BECAME INTERESTED IN YOUR MAJOR RESEARCH AREAS, AND HOW YOU FOUND YOUR WAY TO DU.

My path to philosophy was circuitous. I began college as a dance major. It didn't take me long to decide that, as an artist, I would need good dance training, but also a broad education in the liberal arts. I kept on taking technique classes but dropped the dance major. Then I had a wonderful academic experience that is rare these days, but I wish were more common. I had no idea what to major in. I signed up for classes that seemed interesting. When I was in my anthropology class, I wanted to be an anthropology major. Then I'd go to my Hebrew language class and want to immerse myself in literature. While in my philosophy class, I wanted to talk and think about philosophy forever! Eventually the life of a performing artist no longer called to me, but dancing is still my favorite activity.

2 WHY DID YOU BECOME A RESEARCHER? WHAT DREW YOU TO THIS FIELD? WHAT MAKES YOU GET UP IN THE MORNING?

When I chose to major in philosophy it was because I felt a natural affinity for philosophical thinking. To quote one of my undergraduate students at DU, I realized that, 'I've been doing this my whole life, I just didn't know it had a name, and I didn't know you could major in it.' One of my first classes after Introduction to Philosophy was on Plato and Aristotle. That professor and his particular approach to metaphysics really resonated with me and permanently shaped my own foundational philosophical views. When it was time to graduate, I couldn't imagine not getting to continue to study philosophy, so I became a graduate student in philosophy and (after a lot of hard work) ended up with a Ph.D. It was never really a plan that I had. I just did what interested me and kept putting one foot in front of the other and got through the program.

3 WHAT ARE YOUR TEACHING INTERESTS? WHAT IS YOUR TEACHING PHILOSOPHY?

One thing I love about teaching in our department is that I get to teach a wide variety of courses. I have a regular rotation of classes on Classical Greek philosophy, but I've taught classes as diverse as philosophy of biology and feminist ethics. No matter what I'm teaching, I think of the writings of the various philosophers that I use in my classes as (very fascinating) vehicles for opening my students up to a certain kind of inquiry and exploration that I think of as 'philosophical.' It involves isolating the commitments, arguments, hypotheses, and models in the stream of an author's written ideas. Sometimes these ideas are stated overtly and clearly, but many historical figures, like Plato, are trying to prod their readers to wake up and reassess their own assumptions as much as they are trying to convince them of any specific conclusions. So arriving at anything we want

to call 'their conclusions' is a complicated philosophical exercise that is wrought with controversy. That's what makes the practice of reading philosophy so rich and engaging, but it also means you can't just read a text from a disinterested point of view to 'see' what a philosopher thought and then figure out what you think about it—your own philosophical development interacts with your efforts at interpreting any text.

4 HOW DO YOUR INTERESTS IN WHAT YOU TEACH IN THE CLASSROOM CORRELATE TO THE RESEARCH YOU DO?

All of my publications to date have been on Plato's psychology, metaphysics, or epistemology. Still, every class I teach—no matter how unconnected it might appear to be to these topics—contains a driving idea or framework that I have touched upon in my research. One example is the class I teach called, Philosophical Perspectives on Perception and Reality: We only read around 10 pages of Plato right at the beginning. However, I designed the course through my realization that the first third of Plato's dialogue, the *Theaetetus*, contains a cycle of 'experiments' concerning theories of knowledge. These thought experiments compare what happens when we assume that what we come to know is part of the perceptible world versus what happens when we assume that it is unperceivable and not spatiotemporal. I think that this is the same cycle that Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume go through as they respond to each other in the Early Modern Period. So, I teach these Early Modern works to help my students understand a problem that everyone who tries to theorize about knowledge will confront. But it allows me to teach philosophers other than Plato as I communicate this idea to them, and they learn a lot of Early Modern philosophy in that class.

5 DESCRIBE YOUR CURRENT RESEARCH IN LAYMAN'S TERMS. IN OTHER WORDS, DESCRIBE THE VERY BASICS OF THE FIELDS YOU STUDY AND TEACH AND THEIR COMMON APPLICATIONS.

I am about to publish a book in which I caution those who want to understand Plato's view of knowledge that they must first understand how Plato thinks about all of the kinds of 'beliefs' we have that fall short of knowledge. I put 'beliefs' in quotes because I am really analyzing what Plato refers to using the Greek word '*doxa*' and part of my argument is that it is not really the same thing that we refer to as 'belief' in English. Now I am starting a new project that I hope will help people outside of philosophy who want to talk about things like race and gender as 'socially constructed.' I think my background in metaphysics will allow me to give other researchers ways to analyze when a social construction is useful, when it is dangerous, and when it is dangerous as currently constructed but might be usefully constructed in a different way.

6 CAN YOU SHARE A TURNING POINT OR DEFINING MOMENT IN YOUR WORK AS A RESEARCHER?

I am at a turning point right now. I am disturbed by the way our country is dealing with race and gender. I think people are right to say that race and sex are socially constructed. However, after making this claim, I see that many people don't really know how to follow up on that realization. I want to give those who engage in research that informs public policy and education tools to continue the conversation that they start when they point out that something like race is a social construction. Not all social constructions are harmful. We seem to think that social constructions like laws and high school diplomas can enhance our lives. When a social construction is harmful, it is possible that we need to restructure it rather than abandon it. My thinking and research on this subject will be very different from what I have done in the past, but it is informed by my work on Plato's Metaphysics and Epistemology.

7 TELL ME WHAT YOU LIKE TO DO WHEN YOU AREN'T WORKING ON RESEARCH.

As I mentioned earlier, I love to dance. Since the pandemic started, I mostly have to dance in my house. I also have been a yoga practitioner for two decades. I used to teach yoga regularly and even trained others to teach yoga, which was great experience for reflecting on teaching in general. I brought as many insights from teaching yoga into my DU classroom as I brought from the philosophy classroom into the yoga studio. I love to hike. I also try very hard to get around with walking, my bicycle, and public transportation. I derive satisfaction from figuring out how to avoid using my car. I love reading fiction, going to live theater, and listening to live and recorded music.

8 WAS THERE EVER AN OUTCOME IN YOUR RESEARCH THAT WAS UNEXPECTED, OR DID YOU EVER ENCOUNTER A SURPRISING SETBACK? HOW DID YOU REACT AND ADAPT?

The book that I am about to publish has only around one third of the content of my original manuscript. I feel very good about what it is in it, but I feel a loss at not publishing all of the parts that I had to leave out. I have come to accept that some of it would take a whole second lifetime to get into shape for publication. Also,

while the central ideas that won't be published are part of my philosophical identity, some of the background research that I would have to include to make them acceptable to journals and presses in my field is not something to which I want to devote time. I'd rather turn my energies toward new ideas at this point even though I think these other ideas that won't get published are very important.

9 IF YOU COULD GO BACK IN TIME AND GIVE ADVICE TO YOURSELF BEFORE YOU BEGAN YOUR CAREER, WHAT WOULD IT BE?

Really my only regret is that I didn't study Latin in High School. It would have set me up better for learning the languages that I needed for Classical Greek philosophy.

10 WHAT IS THE MOST FRUSTRATING, AND MOST REWARDING ACTIVITY, RESPECTIVELY, IN YOUR DAY-TO-DAY WORK?

I find both teaching and research very rewarding. I also love to write and to edit my own writing. Unfortunately, I don't love reading philosophy (or any non-fiction) as much as I wish I did given how much of it I need to read. While my mind devours fiction easily, non-fiction requires a kind of focus and concentration that demands hyper-attention and consumes more energy than anything else I have to do for work.

Untitled by Mya Vander Pol

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

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